

Migration and Security: Some Key Linkages

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“As migration is defined as the movement of people across national boundaries—an inter-state phenomenon—we would expect it to be addressed by students of international relations. . . . It is . . . glaring to note the absence of migration as a topic in graduate courses in the field and its practical non-existence in the textbooks.”

Understanding the link between population movements and the security of states is particularly significant in an era of globalization and migration. The connection between migration and security, however, is particularly challenging and problematic because migration, security and the linkage between the two are inherently subjective concepts. They are dependent on who is defining the terms and who benefits by defining the terms in a given way. Although there has been considerable research on the subjects of migration and of security, few studies directly address the linkage between the two. Matters of definition, however contentious, are central to the linkage task and provide a necessary entry point for analysis. Some empirically based truisms define the nature of the definitional problem itself. The first section, “Matters of Meaning,” below, provides a framework for tracking migration-security linkages. The framework highlights the complexity and multidimensional nature of migration and security. The next section focuses on the interconnections between migration and security. Specifically, it addresses the implications of state structures and institutional capabilities for the migration-security balance sheet. Given the conceptual chal-

lenges mentioned above, the ideas herein are designed to provide building blocks for further inquiry.

Several factors complicate the definition of key terms. In the domain of mobility, these are captured by the following observations:

- 1) What you see depends on how you look at it
- 2) Who counts defines who is counted
- 3) What is counted depends on who counts, how and why. In other words, who benefits?

In the domain of security, the companion truisms include:

- 1) One's security may be another's insecurity
- 2) Strategies designed to create security may actually enhance insecurity
- 3) Security may be "objective" but in the last analysis it is in the eye of the beholder, i.e., "subjective."

Superficial as these sound bites might appear, they do capture some puzzles that require systematic inquiry. Given the increasing politicization of migration in world politics and by definition the salience of population for politics, as well as the role of politics in national security, matters of definition are central, not peripheral: Clarifying key concepts requires specificity of dimension, logic, metrics and criteria for measure and the methodology of measurement.

Accordingly, we begin first with the meaning of migration and of security, and then we turn to the interconnections. Far from being a simple (and seemingly pedantic) exercise, it is the meanings assigned to these terms that capture the volatility that, under certain conditions, may erode the very foundations of social order—at any level and in any socio-economic context.

MATTERS OF MEANING: A FRAMEWORK FOR TRACKING MIGRATION-SECURITY LINKAGES

We start with the security calculus—proposing a way to capture the key factors and processes that constitute the condition we refer to as security. While the level of analysis here is that of the nation-state in international relations, the fundamentals at hand

may well be largely generic, whereby the idiosyncrasies and specifics of a situation are accounted for, and captured by, a common logic. The same applies to the dimensions of migration. At the onset we may be on relatively solid ground. There appears to be an emerging consensus about the complexity of security and about the multidimensionality of migration.

The Security Calculus

The security calculus presented here is a derivative logic. It involves fundamental relationships among constituent elements of the social order. We posit this calculus as objective, amenable to empirical (and measurable) assessment. It is then reasonable to juxtapose the objective accounting to a subjective one, i.e., in terms of the meanings, interpretations, values and views ascribed to the calculus by different actors.¹

This proposed calculus views security as a function of three interconnected imperatives that jointly yield one integrated and logical holistic. These imperatives cover the domains of

- 1) Military capacity and defense
- 2) Modes of governance and regime performance
- 3) Structural conditions and environmental viability.

Military Security (MS) refers to the conventional defense concerns that ensure the sanctity of state borders and/or to the use of military instruments for the pursuit of state objectives. It is the ability of the state to defend itself from incursion, attack or invasion. It is the ability to assure security from outside threats.

Regime Security (RS) is used here as a governance concept that refers to the ability of the government and its institutions to discharge formal responsibilities and also to protect itself from domestic disorder, revolt or dissension.

Structural Security (SS) refers to the ability to protect the resilience of life-supporting properties—as well as prevailing sources of livelihood—from erosive pressures.

Two of the terms, MS and RS, are self-explanatory and largely strategically defined constructs. The third, SS, is not obvious: It is the ability to meet the demands of the population (P)

given the availability of resources (R) and the prevailing levels of technology (T) in the context of a given environment (E) and its life-supporting properties. As we have indicated in other contexts, we view P, R and T as master variables that shape the contextual configuration of a country.² The resulting calculus of national security (NS) can be expressed as a simple identity:

$$NS = f (MS, RS, SS)$$

This identity leads to the following proposition: *A state is secure to the extent that all three dimensions or conditions for security are in place*; and it is insecure to the extent that one or more conditions (or dimensions) of security are threatened or eroded. In practice, however, assuring SS is akin to a juggling act: *if (or when) population growth leads to resource needs that exceed the prevailing technological capacity to meet the population's demands and needs, then conditions for structural security are eroded*. Of course, the underlying imperative or dilemma is to make sure that populations do not strain the system's overall ecological, environmental and life-supporting properties.

Extending this logic, we formulate structural security as:

$$SS = f (P, R, T) / E$$

These identities are highly simplified representations of realities. The specific functional form for this aggregate identity is an empirical question. Nonetheless, we do know that the right-hand terms are highly interdependent, causally connected, and possibly even in conditions of mutual hostage. For example, regime security is undermined to the extent that government is unable to perform its functions effectively (for example, by not managing its structural security). It may be also undermined by threats from the outside (i.e., military action). We also know that only when security of borders is assured can attention be given to the management of structural conditions.

The security logic thus represents a baseline framework to indicate where and how migration may enter into the security calculus. So far it is a static accounting; we have not yet introduced the sources of change that steer it toward 'more' or 'less'

security. We can appreciate that the migration linkages enter this calculus primarily through potential perturbations generated by the population factor—but, given the attributes of the migrants and the forms of migration, it also affects, directly and indirectly, the R and T terms as well. In this context, however, since the P-factor is fundamental—pervasive in defining a social order—we need to recognize the parsimony and the power of the master variables. What happens to the security calculus when the P-factor is disturbed?

The P- Factor

In an earlier study, the role of population in international interactions has been characterized in the following forms, as a

- 1) *parameter* of a social situation, defining the actors, the contenders and the nature of the contentions at the starting line
- 2) *multiplier* of prevailing contentions, potentially shaping new ones as the dynamics of interaction work their way through time
- 3) *variable* both shaping and shaped by the dynamics of the interactions at hand and responding to both the parametric and the multiplier effects.³

These distinctions were the result of comparative case studies of 45 threats to security and violent conflicts in developing countries. These cases provided a baseline for the first systematic framing of the population-conflict connections.⁴

The three forms of the P-factor are noted here in the aggregate. The 45 cases further supported the proposition that, at this level of aggregation, migration *per se* can be characterized in the same way. Equally relevant is the companion result that the role and implications of the P-factor (and of migration) *changes* in the course of the evolution (or unfolding) of a conflict situation.

In consideration, for example, of the conflicts between the Arab states and Israel (and between Israel and the Palestinians), a near text-book case emerges of the role of population factors in the unfolding of a conflict as well as in the shaping of its evolution and transformation over time. Without presuming to provide a complete view of this conflict—or its ideological, religious and strategic dimensions—it would be fair to say that one of the

major contributors to this long-standing set of disputes was the migration of Jews from Europe throughout the first part of the twentieth century and then more systematically after the Second World War. During the early period, population served as a variable, whereby migration into the region altered its demographic composition (in terms of ethnicity and skills) and clearly positioned the Arabs in competitive stance with the European immigrants.

The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the outbreak of war with the Arab states altered the existing demographic balances somewhat by forcing the establishment of refugee camps to house the displaced Arab populations. At that point, population factors (which had been variables in the earlier years) were further complicated by “refugeeism” (a new variable in this context).

Throughout the following decades, population factors had become parameters of the conflict in that these characterized the adversaries, reinforced their conflictual stance and exacerbated the political and strategic meaning of ethnic and religious divisions. These trends were consolidated during the years between the 1956 war and the 1967 war. The Six-Day War, as the latter is usually labeled, created new refugees, exacerbated the plight of those displaced earlier and provided multiplier effects, in the sense that refugees served as multipliers in an already intense hostile conflict situation.

The defeat of the Arab states by Israel in 1967 contributed to the consolidation of the Palestinian political identity—hence to the demographic features of a new and distinct dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict. (Concurrently, of course, the skill differentials between the Arab population and the Israeli state shifted prevailing perceptions in world politics of Israel as the weaker party in the conflict with the Arabs. Israeli’s military superiority was well established.) The subsequent migration of Jews from Arab states to Israel—a trend that had begun much earlier—influenced the demographic composition of Israel in ways that could not be entirely ignored within the context of the state’s democratic political process. These patterns persisted,

roughly unchanged in form but characterized by greater hostility, revealing the demographic parameters of the conflict and the difficulties of shaking the status quo.

Two further demographic features created multiplier effects. One was a difference in the age distribution of the contenders (with the Arab and Palestinian populations exhibiting far more rapid rates of growth—hence a younger population over time—than the Israelis, whose demographic patterns were more similar to those of the industrial West than to their own neighbors'). The second was the large-scale migration of Russian Jews—shaped in large part by dramatic changes in the Soviet polity and reinforced by its eventual dissolution. The new immigrants could be considered new variables in this conflict, but, more important, they provided added multiplier effects in the already complex parameters of contention and violence.

Clearly, none of the foregoing suggests that the Arab-Israeli conflicts and the wars between the Israelis and the Palestinians can be reduced to demographic factors alone. Nor can it suggest that the conflicts were (and continue to be) shaped by population factors alone. It does indicate, however, that ideological, strategic, political or historic factors that characterize this adversarial situation cannot be understood without commensurate analysis of the demographic correlates—as variables, parameters and multipliers of conflict and violence. At the same time, however, population factors feature prominently in the security calculations of the various adversaries. Sensitivity to casualties incurred is always a salient issue in Israeli strategic planning (as it is in all democracies). This means that the military dimension of security can also be held hostage to population factors (even in the case of Israel even with its clear strategic dominance of the situation).

Such are some complexities of the population-conflict connection. What is it that people do that engenders considerations of, or concerns for, security? Since population is not neutral with respect to its socio-economic context, there are some security-specific implications—transcending matters conventionally regarded as largely demographic, economic or social. Simply,

people make *demands* and exert *claims* that elicit a political *response*. The demands and claims may or may not be specifically political in content. But as long as they are perceived as political, routed through political channels or transmitted through political mechanisms, they in essence become political. Paradoxically, of course, if the political system is not able to acknowledge that demands are being made and/or that responses may be required, then people will express their demands through mechanisms of opposition or in ways that are not considered legitimate by those in control of the political regime. Tracing the claims (and perceptions thereof) leads through *politicization* channels that transform population variables from demographic considerations to political ones.

In democratic societies, it is taken for granted that demands will be expressed through the political process and that mechanisms of representation and participation—through the act of voting, for example—provide connectives between people's demands and politicians' responses.

In traditional societies (such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and others), some form of advise and consent mechanism takes place to serve such functions. The political rules are such—almost everywhere in the world—that only citizens can formally participate in the political process. When a large bulk of a country's population consists of non-citizens due to long-term effects of large scale labor in-migration (as in the Gulf countries of the Middle East), then population composition *per se* defines the effective boundary of the polity—in terms of who counts and who is counted. Invariably such boundaries are transformed into fault-lines, reinforcing prevailing cleavages and creating both the reality and the perception of differentials in access to the political system.

The seemingly technical matter of counting the number of people can itself be intensely political in nature, often making it difficult to arrive at a robust estimate of the totals, i.e., one that is not contested by any group in the society. For example, the last census taken in Lebanon was in 1932 at a time when a fragile social contract and a democratic polity were based on some

understanding of the prevailing balance among the various ethnic and religious groups. Everyone understood that clarification in itself would be destabilizing. Some forty years later the country broke out into a long civil war where the major cleavages were along ethnic and religious lines—which induced massive out-migration of people seeking security and thus created a new wave of migration, augmenting the more traditional, earlier pattern of migrants seeking employment.

In industrial and democratic countries, notably the United States, when the census itself shapes the configuration of the polity, methodological debates become political ones. The methods utilized in the recent census, a seemingly apolitical mechanism (census-taking), elicited powerful political contentions, placing the US Census Bureau in the position of defending its methods as well as the results. The US case is especially important as immigration has been the backbone of the political reality since the creation of the country, and it continues to be a central feature of the social contract and of attendant political norms.

In this connection, it is important to stress that the migration-security linkages in the United States are mediated by a set of norms that defines demographic and cultural diversity as an asset rather than a liability, i.e. as strengthening the state and its values rather than undermining its identity. The same cannot be said of all other democratic countries, where social and demographic diversity is generally regarded more as a liability than an asset. Obvious as that may seem, nonetheless it does lead to the attractive proposition that *if* the political system accepts or even values, demographic and social diversity, and when mechanisms are in place to recognize and accommodate this diversity, *then* the migration will not become a determining factor in the nation's security calculus or a key factor in gauging its degree of insecurity. In other words, there is a powerful role for the political system in decoupling migration and security.

Much of the foregoing is framed in the context of political behavior, institutional conditions and behavior patterns. But we must appreciate how incomplete such a discussion of migration-

security connections can be if we do not broaden our terms of reference. More specifically, among the most pervasive security-related implications of population movement are those that affect (and are affected by) the natural environment. Fundamentally, of course, people influence their natural environments in both direct and indirect ways. Nature is not neutral with respect to the number of people that are drawing on environmental services—such as clean air and water—and environmental security can be eroded by migration as the demands of people strain the resilience of ecological balances. The claims people make may be close to the margin of survival (populations in rural China), or they may range all the way to potentials for large-scale environmental disturbances (such as transformation from the natural or the built environment, i.e., urbanization in any society).

Over the past decades, many examples of the unfortunate connections between migration, environment and security have emerged as population pressures on life-supporting properties force people to cross territorial boundaries, become environmental refugees and be considered threats in the recipient community. Well-recognized environmental dislocations—notably desertification and deforestation—can be exacerbated by, and are often rooted in, movements of people that strain ecological balances and undermine essential life-supporting properties, threatening the very conditions of basic survival.

These examples all illustrate an important precept, namely that nature itself is a player and often a critical actor mediating between migration, on the one hand, and security, on the other. In such cases, the loss of ecological resilience becomes a powerful source of insecurity.

Mapping Migration

Migration is a process. It refers to the movement of people across jurisdictions (both within and across sovereign states). The process can be characterized as an entire system of interactions. Every element of this migration system requires specificity and unbundling. For purposes of parsimony, we differentiate among attributes of the migrants, the motivation and volition of

migrants, the transmission mechanisms for migration and the duration of mobility. Jointly, these features provide insights into the contours for maps of migration.

What follows is a simple accounting to help specify how and why migration may matter to security. It is relevant to the issue of entry-point introduced above—namely how migration intersects with security and where these intersections take place within the security calculus. Migration might affect each of the dimensions of security (individually or jointly) with multiple transmission mechanisms and potential impacts. This means that different types of migration streams and migrant types may have different impacts on their communities of destination (or may encounter a wide range of reactions).

Attributes of Migrants: By necessity if not by tradition, both scholarly and policy analysts differentiate migrants and migration streams by key attributes. Salient among these are volume, skills, ethnicity, age, legal status and a multitude of other factors. Each one of these seemingly clear attributes poses measurement challenges. Even the simple matter of numbers (how many migrants) requires some prior attention to the truisms noted above.

Motivation and Volition: Why people move is less ambiguous. However, this is generally true only at the aggregate level and under highly visible conditions. People move voluntarily (for a variety of reasons related to, and independent of, attributes per se). They may also be forced to move by agents of power using instruments of force. They become refugees. The causes and consequences of refugeeism are usually politically contentious. Managing the process itself can be contentious as well. In the international community, refugee is a legal status and one that may be advantageous relative to other forms of forced mobility, namely those that fall short of the criteria set by international custom or law.

The absence of volition in migration (creating refugeeism) could also be generated by an erosion of life-supporting properties in the home community, with or without the presumption of force and violence. Such mobility has been termed environ-

mental refugeeism. Then, too, the use of force and the instruments of violence may themselves erode environmental balances, reinforcing the process of mobility. A vicious cycle is easily set in motion.

Transmission Mechanisms: At this point the question of how intersects directly with matters of why. People may move as a result of an individual decision or a group decision. Criteria of attributes, affinity and distance are often deemed sufficient to determine why and how people move. But there are also forms of organized mobility through official (or unofficial) institutional mechanisms, accompanied by various degrees of legality at both ends of the transmission process. Prominent among the organized forms are imports and exports of labor tied to employment conditions (generally covered in the literature under the rubric of labor as a commodity). In such cases transmission is related to status.

Duration and Complexity of Mobility: Duration is conventionally defined as short or long term, a seemingly clear and simple distinction. Yet the impact of mobility is itself closely connected to duration (and to attributes of migrants). One of the least appreciated features of duration pertains to the long-term consequences of short-term mobility and, conversely, to the short-term consequences of strategies designed to alter long-term mobility streams.

The history of migration in Western Europe following the Second World War illustrates these interacting complexities, particularly in the cases of France and Germany. In each case, labor migration was initially designed as a mechanism for meeting the immediate shortages due to the war. Importing foreign labor—guest workers as they were known at the time—was a policy born of practical necessity. The immediacy of the situation took precedence over attention to long-term considerations. It was not until decades later—with the appearance of a new generation born to guest workers that the implications of earlier policies became more fully recognized. Over time, the social order in Germany and in France appeared to be changing with the apparent settlement of migrants from North Africa (in France)

and from Turkey (in Germany), whose presence underscored the cultural and religious differences between the migrants and their host communities.

At this writing, almost every country in Western Europe is envisaging policies to restrict further migration and to respond effectively to the apparent social cleavages that are regarded as potentially undermining the social contract. At this point, the pursuit of policies to reduce the presence and/or the visibility of people whose parents come from alien cultures and foreign countries run the risk of undermining the moral principles of the democratic political order.

Different countries in Europe respond in different ways to these dilemmas. But none has found easy ways of adjusting to changing demographic conditions and all remain concerned about the presence of outsiders in their midst. In such cases, it remains for the political system itself to manage the discomforts engendered by a large number of outsiders (many of whom have already become citizens). And when this happens, the entire fabric of social policy can be affected in terms of who can claim benefits, when, how and how much. In such cases, threats to security, if any, are likely to be internally generated—traced to the changing demographic composition of the country and to the adjustments to such changes—rather than created by prospects of external threats.

For example, Austria has been unable to control large-scale inflows due to violence in and among adjacent states. Austria found itself confronted by the demographic consequences of political conflicts and instability in Eastern Europe following the breakdown of Soviet Union. Violence in neighboring countries created large numbers of refugees seeking to cross the border into Austria. Without imputing powerful causality, it is nonetheless reasonable to draw attention to the backlash in the political system and to the articulation of a strong anti-immigrant stance. Austria is illustrative in this regard, but it is not unique. France and Germany are also struggling with they acknowledge to be a complex set of challenges to the established political order.

When we consider the combined implications of affinity, employment, ethnicity and duration, the complexities abound, but so does the understanding of nuances shaped by matters of identity, groupness and other softer social variables that define the us versus them mindset. A point of entry into the security calculus takes place when we protect ourselves against them.

Multiplier Effects: In this connection, we are beginning to understand the *multiplier effects* of migration in both economic and political domains and, by extension, the connections to security. Put starkly, there are cases in which the migration process itself generates endogenous demands for additional migrants.⁵ In the Gulf region of the Middle East, for example, we see this most clearly in cases where meeting the legitimate demands of the migrants themselves requires augmenting the labor force to provide services required to support their own social needs. Obviously, migrants are consumers in the generic sense, but they are also voters in the euphemistic sense with or without formal political participation. Accordingly, the claims that they make or that they are perceived to be making that renders them functional voters.

One of the most revealing illustrations of the multiplier effect is evidenced by the patterns of labor migration of Asians to the oil-producing Gulf countries of the Middle East. This desert region was sparsely populated when oil was first discovered. Asians—along with other groups—were recruited early on for the development of the oil industry. As they settled and became a permanent, even dominant, feature of the labor force, they reproduced the social customs and patterns of behavior of their community of origin. As the number of migrants grew, so did their needs for social and other services. Meeting their own demands meant creating new services, which, by necessity, translated into new employment opportunities. Such opportunities served as pull factors, which were then transformed into recruitment activities to meet the added demand. The migrants retained their citizenship of origin as citizenship laws in the recipient communities precluded any form of naturalization. Over time, the foreign workers dominated the entire labor force and,

with their families, served as a growing source of consumer demand—over and above the demands generated by the natural growth rate of the citizens themselves.⁶ And nationals could or would not contribute to the reduction of persistent labor shortages.

Concurrently, the economic development strategies of the Gulf states—and of all other countries in the region—were based on a standard economic growth model and the quest for industrialization. The governments in the Gulf region in particular, encouraged by international institutions, invested in capital-intensive industrial programs, massive infrastructure projects and large-scale efforts to expand the built environment. By definition, this strategy required foreign labor; these countries had imported large numbers of migrant workers since the early days of independence. The choice of industrial development—which required imported labor—led to additions to the labor market.

The more these countries expanded their investments in industry, manufacturing and infrastructure—in the effort to diversify away from dependence on oil extraction and exports—the more the need for and dependence on foreign workers grew. One exception was the short-lived efforts of the Government of Kuwait in the mid-1980s to reassess its entire development strategy and define a new value-added trajectory to minimize reliance on foreign labor. The 1991 Gulf war and the invasion of Kuwait brought these efforts to a halt. In the reconstruction initiatives following liberation, government and society reverted once more to the familiar strategies of large-scale labor imports, thereby reproducing and extending the very conditions that the country had sought to avoid a few years earlier.

Types and Transformations: The foregoing provides the building blocks for defining two added features of the migration system: types of migrations and the transformation of these types. There is no dearth of typologies in the migration literature, but there are serious difficulties of convergence. Typologies are, invariably, based on some criteria and are often applied with less consistency than is required for purposes of systematic in-

quiry. As a result, typologies have tended to be situation-specific, thereby eluding principles of generalization.

What follows is an illustrative list of migration types defined by motivation: *why* people move, to what extent this mobility is *voluntary* and what their resulting *status* might be. In those terms, several forms are noteworthy in their robustness; they are dominant examples that may not necessarily exhaust type possibilities:

- 1) Migration for employment
- 2) Seasonal mobility
- 3) Non-legal migrants
- 4) Religious pilgrims
- 5) Permanent settlers
- 6) Refugees as forced migration
- 7) State-sponsored movements
- 8) Brain drain and “reversals” of drain
- 9) Forms of “returneeism”
- 10) Environmental migration.

This exercise is a reminder, once again, of the *relational* basis of migration. Contextual factors enter into the definition of migration types and are formalized with reference to jurisdiction and to the use of state institutions (at both ends of the migration stream). And this highlights the matter of jurisdiction—the defining condition for cross-border mobility.

The transformation of migration is as much a change in status as it is an effective change in the role and reality of the migrants. For example, a non-legal migrant may become a legal migrant in search of employment and then possibly a permanent settler. The case of Israel is particularly illustrative, but not unique. Refugees may be reclassified as migrants for employment. Returneeism may be viewed as or confused with new migration. And the possibilities go on. These contingencies create added difficulties in retaining consistency of measurement. In other words, “who counts and who is being counted?”

Crossing Borders: Territorial borders in international relations denote bounds of sovereignty.⁷ State borders are characterized as follows:⁸

- 1) Boundaries are man-made and partly protected, but they are also fallible
- 2) They delineate the legitimate exercise of political authority (as well as responsibility)
- 3) They convey that states are autonomous in the exercise of authority within their jurisdictions—even though the impacts may be felt elsewhere
- 4) States are seldom able in practice, however, to exercise their internal authority over external consequences as effectively as they desire
- 5) They are generally unable to control access across their boundaries (of people, goods, and services) entirely
- 6) They cannot insulate or protect themselves effectively from the actions of states in other jurisdictions.

Given that the reality of national borders—delineating limits of sovereign jurisdiction—is the defining factor of the modern international system at any point in time, one tends to assume that borders are known, fixed and permanent. Under such conditions, migration means crossing borders.⁹ But these conditions can be variables in international politics and are not always fully known. What happens when borders move but people do not? How can there be a migration phenomenon in the absence of actual mobility? The redrawing of maps is a reality of international politics. In the nineteenth century, the political cartography of Africa was a central feature of, and resulted from shifts in, colonial power interactions. The international community later recognized that the resulting map is not consistent with the affinities on the ground. In the twentieth century, we saw notable cases of jurisdictional re-engineering. Of these the demise of the Soviet Union triggered the most profound strategic changes for the global system as a whole. And the imperfections of such re-engineering are attested to, almost on a daily basis, by upris-

ings in various parts of the new jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.

What does changing borders mean for our understanding of population mobility? At a minimum, the redefinition of boundary of the state has direct implications for legal status—for individuals, groups and aggregate populations. This reality—and all of the uncertainties that it entails—points directly to the intermediation processes and to structures and contingencies that shape the linkages between migration and security.

THE LINKAGE PROCESS: INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN MIGRATION AND SECURITY

Missing Migration

As migration is defined as the movement of people across national boundaries—an inter-state phenomenon—we would expect it to be addressed by students of international relations. Impressive in this connection is the extent of divergence between such expectations and the subjects usually covered in the field of international relations. It is even more glaring to note the absence of migration as a topic in graduate courses in the field and its practical non-existence in the textbooks. A detailed survey of all major (and minor) international relations texts undertaken in the early 1980s signaled this gap. These conclusions remain largely unchallenged.¹⁰

Characteristically, international migration continues to be viewed as falling outside the bounds of the scholarly field of international politics. Even when the issues examined call for analysis of the security and sanctity of the state in world politics, one finds little attention, if any, paid to the movement of people. And when migration is recognized, it is almost always in idiosyncratic terms—a case analysis—not in terms of generic theoretical underpinnings or attendant processes.

It is from studies of politics *within* states that we find the most empirically informed inquiries of causes and consequences of migration. But these are seldom addressed in relation to security. Accordingly, we now focus first on state structures and regulations and then turn to institutional capabilities and per-

formance. Finally we can summarize the implications on the migration-security balance sheet in terms of key propositions.

State Structures

To simplify, we highlight only two features of state structures directly relevant to migration and security. One pertains to the physical descriptors of the state (i.e., size, demography, economic configuration, etc.) and the other to modes of population status (i.e., citizenship laws, benefits and entitlements, rules of access regulating entry and exit).

Case materials and examples aside, there are, as yet, no large-scale, empirically grounded comparative analyses of the relationship between mobility, security and state structures. Some patterns are in evidence, but the insightful interpretations are yet to be made. At a minimum, it is reasonable to expect that demographic context matters, but precisely how we have not yet formed a scholarly consensus. Anecdotally, for example, one can characterize the extreme cases whereby the stability of the social contract is contingent on the existence of a migrant population—one that is generally viewed with suspicion, excluded from politics and seen by nationals as fundamentally threatening to the stability and security of the state. The Gulf states of the Middle East best illustrate these features.

The rules of citizenship are generally a good indicator of the politicization of migration.¹¹ The rules themselves set the bounds of politics in terms of what can or cannot be done by migrant populations as well as the benefits available to them. Citizenship also defines demographic legitimacy whereby only those who are citizens are effectively legitimate actors in domestic politics and operationally enfranchised political participation. Few societies accord to non-citizens rights similar to those of citizens. This pattern is the norm, not the exception. And it derives almost exclusively from the institution of citizenship, the single most powerful correlate of state sovereignty.

All else being equal, citizenship criteria (i.e., acquisition by choice vs. ascription at birth) go a long way in setting the stage for the politicization of migration and linkages to security. As-

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cription formalizes demographic distinctions and reinforces divisiveness; it does not create a security threat, but it does crystallize the lines of contention.

If citizenship refers to the rules by which people are recognized, categorized and processed in the context of the political, the companion rules pertain to access. The state determines who enters, who exits and why. But implementation is contingent on state capacity. Access rules, by definitions, are designed to protect the state with the understanding that their violation undermines state security. At issue here is less the empirical condition of threat to security than the perceptions of threat. Returning to the P-factor, introduced in the security calculus above, rules of citizenship and of access are at an interface of the migration-security linkages.

Institutional Capacities

Transcending the interface of migration and security is the role of institutional capacity. The institutions of the state provide significant intermediation between demography and security. The difference between strong and weak states is useful largely in highlighting an important distinction, but it does not address the matter of implications if a state is strong or weak with respect to what? At issue is how the state discharges its institutional and, where relevant, its constitutional responsibilities, and whether migrants are included or excluded from the pool of populations served.

The calculus here implies some empirically viable ratio between the loads (or demands) on the state and its capabilities (or ability to manage these loads through institutionalized capabilities). Tracking the loads to capabilities ratio yields a rough rule of thumb about state performance and the potentials for adjusting to the migration elements of the P-factor.

Jointly, the rules of citizenship and access and the institutional capacities help shape responses to migration and the connections to security. These are powerful mediators that render meanings to numbers, thus determining whether migrants are wanted or unwanted, socially assimilated or segregated, included

or excluded by the prevailing social contract—and so forth. This last observation highlights a potentially significant correlate of mobility. Migration itself may, over time, provide the basis for changes in the social contract and when these changes are formalized they are manifested in rules of citizenship and of access.¹²

Key Propositions

At the onset we took note of several truisms that capture key conceptual as well as methodological challenges. The propositions below derive from the logic presented above, the relevant literatures and the empirical evidence to date. However incomplete our assessments might be, at a minimum these can be read as a set of propositions for further inquiry.

1) The impacts of migration patterns on overall national security are transmitted through their influence on any one or more of the constituent elements in the overall calculus. The initial (politically visible) impacts often become evident via regime security. This is because the politicization of migration may have exacerbating effects. The migration process itself may politicize the migrants themselves—as well as the local populations. Who politicizes whom and in what sequence is perhaps less trackable than is the very fact of politicization.

2) The politicization of migration evolves most prominently in terms of a positive feedback, which if unmediated by dampening effects of institutions, social norms or formal regulations reinforce the positive feedback and consolidate perceptions, if not realities, of divisiveness.

3) The more resilient the institutions of the state, the less likely migration will be, or become, a security issue. The less resilient the institutions, the more salient migration will be in the security calculus.

4) Migration is seldom a proximate threat to security; however, the security calculus suggests the entry points that may trigger insecurity. The extent of insecurity is contingent on the above plus the scope, scale and composition of mobility.

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5) By the same token, the logic of feedback serves as a reminder that the loss of security—along any one or more of the core dimensions—may itself serve to trigger added (or initiate new) migration.

6) Migrant attributes (such as ethnicity, religion, age, skill composition, etc.) provide further logic for making migration more rather than less salient to security, thus reinforcing the impacts of migration at the entry points in the security calculus as well as the resultant implications.

These are among the most likely (and potentially robust) generalizations. But they are illustrative at best and most surely not exhaustive. Further, they do not address situations in which migration itself leads to alteration in the entire features of the P-factor and, by extension, how changing demographic conditions affect the nature of the *social contract* (i.e. the core principles of society and the ways in which these are implemented) and the *state system* (i.e. the structures and functions through which a society is governed).

MAJOR STUDIES AND GAPS IN KNOWLEDGE

It is in the logic of the scholarly enterprise that criticism often dominates, obscuring cumulative insights and wisdom of sustained study. With this caveat, I note here major works as well as gaps in knowledge.

Major Studies

Given that the migration-security linkage remains a remarkably understudied domain of research, it is not surprising that the studies deemed major here are not necessarily migration-centered but rather bear directly, and indirectly, on the forms of the linkages and their various manifestations. Several major research initiatives are jointly providing solid foundations for the research of the twenty-first century:

1) *Population Dynamics and International Conflict*: Supported by the Population Council, this study¹³ was one of the earliest projects seeking to identify types and forms of linkages between specific population variables, on the one hand, and particular

contributions to conflict and violence, on the other, while differentiating among various sources and manifestations of hostility. Its publication in 1974 stimulated related work focusing on methodological issues.

2) *Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Population and Conflict*: Sponsored by the United Nations Population Division, this project looked at the population-conflict linkages through the lenses of different social science disciplines.¹⁴ Especially insightful is the juxtaposition of theoretical and empirical insights on the economic features of migration¹⁵ and the conceptual linkages to conflict and warfare.¹⁶

3) *The Environment-Flashpoints Project*: Organized in 1997 by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Environment Center, this large-scale study focused on cross-regional comparisons of the ways in which environmental factors may threaten the security of states by undermining the resilience of life-supporting properties and eroding ecological balances. An extension of this work to highlight the specific role (if any) of migration in all its forms would be an important addition.¹⁷

4) *International Migration in Developing Countries*: Completed in 1999, this major cross-region analysis of sources and consequences of migration with special reference to security considerations was supported by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Drawing on scholarship and ongoing research from the various regions themselves, this initiative provided a more demographically informed view of migration-security connections and attendant implications for research and for policy.¹⁸

5) *MIT Project on International Migration and Security*: A set of case studies, this project delved into the mechanics of how mobility may undermine security and/or be perceived as threatening the stability of the state.¹⁹ Generally qualitative rather than quantitative, with few exceptions, these studies generate thick descriptions of case-specific conditions.

Each of these is a *project-based* initiative, in the sense that it represents the efforts of a large number of scholars, subjected to

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peer review and provides material for discussion in conference contexts. Jointly they provide the bases for many of the inferences drawn in this article and help to identify gaps in knowledge.

Gaps in Knowledge

There is much that we do not know. Suffice it to stress some critical priority areas for future research:

- 1) State of the art reviews of migration-security linkages
- 2) Relevant baselines for both migration and security
- 3) Coherent frameworks for assessing the evidence generated by case studies to date in the absence of standardization
- 4) Systematic exercises in the nature of counterfactuals, i.e., “what would have happened if...?”
- 5) Reviews of existing metrics of migration in their inference bases
- 6) Interdisciplinary, quantitative, falsifiable inquiries of migration-security connections
- 7) Analyses of how migration systems change in response to security concerns, and how security may alter perceptions as well as realities of migration
- 8) Robust Internet resources on migration and support for networking practices exploring causes and effects of national and international migration.²⁰

We have framed these research needs largely from the migration side of the linkages to security. The same type of work needs to be done from the security side of this ledger. The challenge, of course, is to provide and retain a critical balance of research on migration as well as security and their connections. 🏰

Notes

¹ This logic evolved over time, starting from the simple arms race equations to more detailed specification of the causal logic to a formulation of segments or sectors of security. See Nazli Choucri, “Environmental Flashpoints in the Middle East and North Africa,” in Robert C. Chen, Christopher Lenhart and Kara

F. Alkire, eds., *Consequences of Environmental Change—Political, Economic, Social*, Proceedings of the Environmental Flashpoints Workshop sponsored by the Director of Central Intelligence Environmental Center (Reston, VA: 12–14 Nov. 1997).

² The master variables can be construed as the basic building blocs of state power, capacity and performance. See Robert C. North, *War, Peace, Survival: Global Politics and Conceptual Synthesis* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990) especially pp. 119–130.

³ For an early analysis, see Nazli Choucri, *Population Dynamics and International Violence* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1974).

⁴ For an update a decade later, see Nazli Choucri, *Population and Conflict*, Policy Development Studies, no. 8 (New York: United Nations Fund for Population Activities, 1984).

⁵ The first robust empirical studies of the multiplier effect were done by an interdisciplinary MIT team working on the Gulf countries of the Middle East, focusing specifically on Kuwait.

⁶ See Nazli Choucri, “Asians in the Arab World: Labour Migration and Public Policy,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 22, no. 2 (1986) pp. 252–61 for a more detailed discussion of migration patterns and attendant implications.

⁷ For recent expansions of the concept of sovereignty, see Karen T. Litfin, ed., *The Greening of Sovereignty in World Politics* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).

⁸ Extended from Nazli Choucri, “Introduction,” in Nazli Choucri, ed., *Global Accord: Environmental Challenges and International Responses* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993) especially pp. 25–26.

⁹ For insightful and comparative analyses of the ethical dimensions of migration, see David Miler and Sohail H. Hashmi, eds., *Boundaries and Justice: Diverse Ethical Perspectives* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

¹⁰ Prepared by Nazli Choucri for the Harvard-MIT Seminar on International Relations, co-chaired by Hayward Alker and Robert Keohane. (Unpublished paper, 1995).

¹¹ Myron Weiner is credited for drawing attention to this point early on in the history of the Inter-University Seminar on International Migration, Cambridge, MA.

¹² The history of the United States is an excellent (textbook) illustration of this point, as are public debates surrounding periodic changes in immigration policy.

¹³ Nazli Choucri, *Population Dynamics and International Violence: Propositions, Insights, and Evidence* (London: D.C. Heath, 1974).

¹⁴ See John R. Harris and Vijaya Samaraweerak, “Economic Dimensions of Conflict” in Nazli Choucri, ed., *Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Migration and Conflict* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984) pp. 123–156.

¹⁵ See Robert C. North, “Integrating the Perspectives,” in *Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Migration and Conflict*, pp. 195–217.

¹⁶ Reginald T. Appleyard, ed., *Emigration Dynamics in Developing Countries* (Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, 1999).

¹⁷ Chen, Lenhart and Alkire.

¹⁸ Papers presented at the International Organization for Migration Conference on *Managing International Migration in Developing Countries*, chaired by Reginald Appleyard (Geneva: 1997).

¹⁹ Myron Weiner, ed., *International Migration and Security* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).

²⁰ Electronic resources on migration and security—available through MIT's *Global System for Sustainable Development* (GSSD)—represent added sources of knowledge that still remain to be effectively utilized. GSSD is an adaptive and evolving global knowledge system dedicated to sustainable development based on distributed networking principles and practices. Global problems are invariably complex and require a multidisciplinary global approach for analysis, decision-making and solution. This characterization is especially relevant to migration and security. Use of any one of the system's several search engines yields a return of roughly 200 discrete, quality-controlled, pre-selected websites on these two issues. A careful review of their content will yield important insights as yet unrecognized. This is especially relevant to the challenges at hand as imperatives of security often dictate assessments and responses that must take place in what is, in effect, real time. See online at <<http://gssd.mit.edu>>.

