I. Introduction[1]

With the independence of new states in Asia and Africa the number of members in the community of nations has increased from about 75 to 125 since 1946. Each new state has been able to influence the pattern of interstate relations. But most of these states have been reluctant to participate in global conflicts by siding with one bloc against the other; they have declined to subordinate their own interests to the requirements of power politics. The terms "neutralism" and "nonalignment" have been used most frequently when referring to this policy of noncommitment in the Cold War conflict as pursued by so many Afro-Asian nations.[2] By rejecting the overt bipolarization of the world along ideological lines, these states thus constitute an antialliance group and, as such, provide an additional variant to such traditional antialliance postures as neutrality, neutralization, and isolation. Never before in the history of mankind have so many nations attempted to develop a common line of political orientation in global politics. We begin by defining some basic terms.

Neutrality, is generally conceived as a legal position referring to a state's nonparticipation in disputes of other states, and in times of war or in the anticipation of hostilities, to the formal declaration of an impartial position vis-à-vis the belligerent parties. A state's neutrality may be voluntary, safeguarded only insofar as it is respected by other nations, or it may be sanctioned and forcibly maintained by the belligerent nations. In the event of war, a state might declare neutrality and, by extension, abstain from rendering overt assistance to conflicting parties. In return it is accorded a guarantee of territorial integrity, which is forfeited if it becomes involved in the dispute. It could be hypothesized, therefore, that such a policy is adopted mainly when a state perceives its capabilities as low and prefers an institutionalized, nonmilitary guarantee of its own security. In sum, neutrality essentially represents the incorporation of nonalliance policy within the tenet of international law. In behavioral terms, on the other hand, this variant of nonalignment entails noninvolvement in political or military issues. Conceptually at least, a policy of neutrality represents the most intense opposition to, or negation of, alliances and alignments, global as well as regional. The Swiss case well illustrates this posture. Switzerland is not a member of any international alliance, nor is it a member of the United Nations. The rationale underlying her refusal to join the UN is that so doing would, by necessity, involve at some point taking a stance on international policy, thus violating a traditional stance of neutrality. At the same time, however, neutral states—such as Sweden—might lend their good offices for the solution of problems outside the framework of a recognized international

body and might also become actively involved in various international activities. There has also been a tendency, sometimes even a tradition, for neutral states to become engaged in various forms of peacekeeping and humanitarian activities. It might be hypothesized that it is precisely the absence of formal commitments in combination with a low level of involvement in political and military issues that accords these states much of the maneuverability needed to perform such tasks.

Neutralization involves specific formal as well as behavioral stipulations, and also entails direct commitments by *other* nations to the preservation of a neutralized zone. Neutralization is generally thought of as a legal posture whereby the rights, duties, and obligations of the neutralized are upheld and safeguarded by other states and the parameters of permissible behavior constrained and formalized by all parties concerned. Neutralization generally takes place in a localized domain. However, to the extent that the behavior of the neutralized state is severely constrained by the agreement, violating its neutralization might have global consequences. Neutralization occurs only when the guarantor states can agree to the terms of neutralization and persists as long as all parties support the agreement. The position of a neutralized state is generally also one of weakness, and its options are almost completely determined by the guarantors. Developments in Laos in 1971, when American and South Vietnamese forces fought positions held by North Vietnam, well illustrate the fate of a so-called neutralized state when penetrated by stronger parties whether or not they were party to the neutralization agreement.

One might characterize neutralization as an alliance by others not to align with a specific state, and neutrality as a declaration by a state not to align with others. In this fashion neutrality and neutralization represent dual versions of a similar posture. In one case the policy is adopted voluntarily, in the other it is imposed and forcibly sanctioned by other parties. Neutralization generally takes place in high tension areas where an agreement has been reached among the conflicting parties. Neutralization is generally conceived by the major powers and proposed to weaker states. Yet despite the cool reception in Southeast Asia to de Gaulle's proposal in 1965 for a neutralization of Indochina, Malaysia in 1971 succeeded in persuading Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand to endorse a declaration calling for the neutralization of all Southeast Asia. Except for China, major powers have refrained from making a positive reaction, and the five countries have agreed that implementation of the declaration can only follow a reestablishment of peace in the region.

Yet another variant of a nonalliance policy is *isolationism*, which refers to a state's nonparticipation in ongoing conflict systems and low involvement in political and military issues at the global level. The referent system for an isolationist policy is generally the prevailing conflict system, rather than, as with neutrality, *all* conflict systems, global or regional. It is important to stress that this policy refers primarily to the political and military domain and might (or might not) extend to other forms of cooperative behavior. An isolationist policy is exemplified by the position of Great Britain in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the United States in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In general,

isolationist states are not likely to undertake peacekeeping functions or humanitarian missions, although they might, at the same time, become involved with local political and military problems. For example, a state would, as did the United States prior to World War I, adopt an isolationist stance, thereby avoiding direct involvement in ongoing political cleavages at the global level, in this case the balance of power maneuverings in Europe. But this does not mean that the United States refrained from engaging in political maneuverings of its own within a localized domain or sphere of influence, in this case, Latin America. Nor did it mean that the United States refrained from engaging in other types of interactions with the European countries, such as trade, scientific exchanges, and so forth. The point here is that the crucial system referent is the global and not the regional or local one. A *hermit* country withdraws from its own region, as in the case of contemporary Burma.

There is some agreement concerning the relevance of alliances and counteralliances to power configurations and to the degree of stability in the international system; bipolarity and multipolarity are often held to be important determinants of world stability.[3] But insufficient attention has been given to the role of nonalliance postures, both in relation to political configurations and international stability, and in relation to national motivations, imperatives, and objectives. This chapter seeks to rectify the balance by evaluating the impact of policies of nonalignment on both national and global politics. Many of the conditions that have made the policy of nonalignment salient in the past twenty years are no longer as dominant today. India's alliance with the Soviet Union in 1971 is perhaps the end of an era. The issues discussed here are therefore more relevant for the historical and methodological questions they raise about the nature of world politics than for the prediction of events in the immediate future.

In the course of this analysis special attention will be given to *background conditions* ("causes" of nonalignment), to underlying *perceptual orientations* and the decision system which formalizes such behavior, and to the actual *behavioral* correlates or manifestations of this policy. Because nations do not always act in accordance with official policies, nor do their actions necessarily reflect the attitudes and perferences of the leadership, it will also be necessary to consider the *similarity* of both perceptions and behavior to official policy. For example, what would be the costs to nonallied countries like India or Indonesia in relinquishing nonaligned policies and what would be the motivations for such a shift in policy? The same queries might be raised with respect to any aligned state. Are these countries more likely to attain national objectives by adopting an alliance posture? The recent Indian and Egyptian friendship treaties with the USSR must be viewed in the light of national objective and national defense. But what do they mean for the nonaligned posture?

By way of introduction to our discussion of some of these questions in the context of Afro-Asian nonalignment, we shall briefly describe the historical development of this posture, highlight some ambiguities underlying our understanding of Third World policies, and survey recent research on the subject. The present chapter draws upon the traditional literature, the author's own work, and empirical inquiries of scholars working on related questions. It is by juxtaposing these three sets of scholarship that the contributions of systematic analysis to our understanding of these international dynamics can best be assessed.

II.   Afro-Asian Nonalignment: Historical Development and Some Recent Analyses

The development of Afro-Asian participation in the international system can be traced to the close of World War I, the Versailles Peace Settlement, and Wilson's Fourteen Points advocating the principles of self-determination, freedom, and international justice. Japan's rebuff in attempts to establish the principle of racial equality at Versailles, however, suggested that Wilson's policies applied primarily to Europe. In fact, in 1926 the Asian delegate at the Bierville Conference declared that when Europeans thought of peace, they envisioned a European peace which effectively excluded the peoples of Asia and Africa (Poplai, 1955). However, it was not until the close of World War II that the peoples of Asia and Africa became aware that their common colonial experience provided a basis for increasing communication and mobilization among what we now know as the Third World. The first large-scale gathering of Afro-Asian states—at Delhi in 1947—was unofficial, its purpose to promote cultural communication. Nonetheless, it laid the foundation for a conference at Bogor in 1954, convened for the specific purpose of organizing the first international conference of independent Asian and African states. The agenda included a discussion of mutual problems vis-à-vis the major powers, the white community, and the rich states.

The Bandung Conference, which met one year later, can be considered a landmark in the development and consolidation of the nonaligned Afro-Asian group. Despite some shared historical experiences, the group was very heterogeneous in political composition, and it became evident that there would be no place at Bandung for highly controversial issues. Instead, the emphasis was placed on personal communication among Asian and African officials, in an effort to foster greater mutual responsiveness. How significant was this consolidation, what its manifestations in behavioral and political terms were, and what some of the implications would be, are all issues which will be discussed below.

The story of Africa and Asia following the Bandung Conference is rather intricate. The most significant gathering after 1955 was held at Belgrade in 1961. The Afro-Asians were invited by Yugoslavia, whose experiences with the Soviet Union after World War II provided a powerful analogue to her guests' experiences. The Afro-Asians found in Yugoslavia's situation a European parallel to their own; thus, they realized that a nonalignment posture need not necessarily be restricted to the formerly colonized peoples of Asia and Africa but that it could be of wider application. It was at Belgrade that the pursuit of independent behavior was formally sanctioned and promoted and that the emphasis clearly shifted from an Afro-Asian bloc to a *nonaligned* policy. But this did not mean a policy of

.withdrawal or of lack of involvement or participation in ongoing global conflicts: A whole range of informal alignments related to a wide range of issues were permitted and viewed as consistent with a posture of nonalignment.

The final communiqué of the Belgrade Conference focused directly on global issues by specifying the nature of the Afro-Asian role in world politics. Opposition to the cold war, recognition of Communist China, maintenance of peaceful coexistence, and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons were prominent themes. A clear shift in orientation from local to international had taken place. By 1961 the nonaligned states based their *identity* on their ancient civilizations, which they had reappraised so as to cope with the realities of modern life. They defined their international *role* as one of mediator between conflicting parties in world politics. And they defined their international *function* as one of reducing world tensions and stabilizing interaction processes at the global level. Initially, these concepts had been formulated in the context of the Afro-Asian world, but by 1961 a broader framework of nonalignment as an international posture had emerged. During the years that separated Bandung and Belgrade a general agreement had developed:

> We are not . . . neutral. . . . We want it understood that we do not welcome this appellation of being called neutral or neutralist whatever it means. We are not neutral in regard to domination by imperialism and other countries. We are not neutral with regard to the greatest economic and social problems that may arise . . . our position is that we are . . . unaligned and uncommitted . . . in relation to the cold war. . . . We do not belong to one camp or another [*General Assembly Official Records*, 1960, pp. 440–460].

By 1961 the basic tenets of nonalignment had crystallized. There would be no military or political alliance with major powers, and the role of the Third World was to become an active one in the international system, clearly replacing passive acceptance of major power decisions and actions. The final communiqué of the Belgrade Conference declared that.

> the participants of the Conference consider it essential that the nonaligned countries should participate in solving outstanding international issues concerning peace and security in the world as none of them can remain unaffected by or indifferent to these issues [*The Conference of Heads of State*, 1961, p. 256].

The term "nonalignment" was used with great frequency in the speeches presented at these conferences, while the word "neutralist" was barely mentioned and "neutrality" appeared only once or twice. Far from being a question of semantic preference, the choice may well indicate that the governments perceived a distinction between their own stance and the neutrality of Sweden and Switzerland, on the one hand, or the forced neutralization of Laos, on the other. The terms were differentiated as follows:

> . . . non-alignment is not neutrality, let there be no confusion on that score. Non-alignment is not the sanctimonious attitude of the man who holds himself aloof—"A plague on both your houses." Non-aligned policy is not a policy of neutrality without its own colour; being non-aligned does not mean becoming a buffer state between the two giant blocs. Non-alignment is active devotion to the lofty cause of justice and the freedom to be free. It is the determination to serve this cause; it runs congruent with the social consciousness of man [*The Conference of Heads of State*, 1961, p. 27].

Little was said about active intervention or mediation in the Cold War. The nonaligned are pressured by demands and appeals from East and West, by the requirements of power politics, by their own domestic economic and political needs, by their search for an independent international posture, and by the incongruity between their demands concerning reduction of international tensions and their capability of directly bringing about any changes in the global configuration. Such pressures tend to move them partly in the direction of the Soviet bloc and partly in the direction of the Western bloc, with the effect that they lack a firm basis for commitment to either of the dominant alliance systems. The cross-pressure hypothesis in the field of political behavior—that individuals who are not fully committed to a political party are those who feel the most cross-pressured—thus accounts for the predicament of nonaligned states (Alker and Russett, 1965, pp. 253–273).

There are to date only a few systematic analyses of the phenomenon of nonalignment and even fewer empirical investigations of interactions and transactions among Asian and African states. Some are worthy of note, however, for the insight and clarity of thought they bring to the diffuse phenomenon of Afro-Asian nonalignment (Lyon, 1963; Jansen, 1966; Sayegh, 1964). For the most part in these studies, assessments of Third World nonalignment entail discussion of the origins, characteristics, and professed goals of this posture. What follows below is a brief summary of some of the more salient conclusions.

The origins of nonalignment usually are attributed to various environmental and systemic factors. Variables relating to the configuration of the international system, domestic conditions, historical experiences, and the attitudes and beliefs of elites and nonelites in these countries have been studied, but there is little consensus as to how these variables account for contemporary Afro-Asian postures.

In terms of attitudes and beliefs, nonalignment is viewed simultaneously as a reaction against Cold War politics, a resistance to great-power "sphere of influence" patterns (Sayegh, 1964), and a "basic endeavor to avoid having to choose between the United States and the Soviet Union, between capitalism and communism" (Freymond, 1965, p. 28). At the same time the nonaligned are also described as "playing both sides against the middle" and as a "third force" for "stabilizing international relations on a lower level of tension between the adversary blocs" (Liska, 1962b, p. 212). These analysts generally stress nonbelligerence as a prominent characteristic of the antialliance posture.

In contrast with its origins and characteristics, scholars portray the goals of nonalignment in fairly explicit terms, as found in official statements by the leaders of various nonaligned states. Internal objectives include the acceleration of eco-

nomic and political development, the acquisition of economic and capital skills "from whatever source that is willing and able to offer these without any strings" (Rajan, 1965, p. 126), and the reduction of "dependence on external factors" (Rossi, 1963, p. 47). By these means, the attempt is made to minimize, if not eliminate, the influence of colonialism and Western penetration while at the same time guarding against Communist penetration. In terms of foreign policy objectives, there is some consensus among scholars that nonaligned states—officially at least—seek to bring about a rapprochement between the major powers while concurrently enhancing their own position and acquiring status far beyond their capabilities. Obviously, domestic objectives are closely related to foreign policy objectives, so that often a claim is made that these states adopt and utilize their international position for purposes of maximizing such internal payoffs as consolidating the position of the national leadership or bringing about greater internal cohesion by avoiding the delicate choice of a particular political alignment. Sukarno, according to Feith (1959, p. 227), maintained a policy of nonalignment to prevent the rise of Communist and Western counterelites within his own country.

Three scholars have developed theoretical overviews of nonalignment. Peter Lyon (1963) examines the historical development of various kinds of nonalliance postures at different time periods and in all areas of the world as the basis for a classification of nonalliance policies. Fayez Sayegh (1964), in a similar exercise, concentrates exclusively on the Middle East; he develops an extensive typology, but many of his generalizations have not survived the test of time, in part because of the volatile nature of Arab politics. The third work of relevance here is a compilation of studies of countries, edited by John Burton (1966), whose own introduction includes a brief summary of pertinent historical developments. As a national policy, nonalignment is considered a "response which stems from self-interest."

Although little quantitative work has been done in the area of nonalignment some attention has been given to the role of the small powers in international politics (Jack, 1963; Rowe, 1963; Young, 1967).[4] Daniel Frei's (1969) study of international mediation, conflict reduction, and small powers employs a general model for explicit hypotheses and empirical techniques. Applications of formal and mathematical thinking to these types of international problems include the works of Hirschman (1964) and Mushakoji (1967). Recent efforts to examine nonalignment systematically are discussed in the following sections, beginning with a proposed framework for the analysis of the Third World.

III. Afro-Asian Nonalignment: A Framework

The first step in clarifying our thinking about a complicated issue such as nonalignment, and the role of the Afro-Asian states in the international system, is to develop a framework which will summarize as specifically as possible our hypotheses about the phenomenon and about the expected interrelationships among its various components. Briefly, we shall argue in the next few pages that a useful way of looking at national and international behavior is within an interaction framework which distinguishes among causes, characteristics, and consequences of behavior in the manner shown in Fig. 5:1.


Figure 5:1. An interaction model of national behavior (adapted from Holsti *et al.*, 1964).

Before listing the diverse influences or *background conditions* contributing to the formulation of nonalignment policies we need to specify, first, the *general* variables involved and, second, those variables from which basic distinctions among the individual Afro-Asians are drawn. No two states are exactly alike, but differences need not overshadow some basic similarities. The relevant general variables pertain to environmental, historical, and political factors shared by most Afro-Asians. The more specialized variables are those which help explain different experiences and circumstances for each state. For example, no two states could be more different in geographical location, domestic attributes, and ethnic composition than Morocco and Burma, yet they are both committed to a nonaligned posture.

The shared context within which the Afro-Asians attempt viable policies in the international system include the bipolarization of the system at the close of World War II; the formation of two antagonistic alliances, each predicated on strong opposition to an adversary; the coincidence of historical experiences in terms of colonial background; the structure of the international system confronting the Afro-Asians upon attainment of their independence; and the search for national identity. Many of these states were pressured to declare allegiance to one of the competing groups, a choice which to the new states seemed at the least unnecessary, if not moreover undesirable: The issues crucial to the Afro-Asians were markedly different from those of greatest priority to the major powers.

Domestic considerations were no less important in leading to nonalignment. The internal political network of the new states and crises of national identity

concerning the locus of domestic political authority reinforced a need for adopting, formally at least, an independent posture. From this position the new states would then be able to search for a viable international role (Nasser, 1961; Nehru, 1969). Indian nonalignment, for example, was motivated as much by international considerations (proximity to the two largest Communist powers) as by the domestic imperatives of attaining internal cohesion and establishing authority within a democratic framework (Nehru, 1969). The diversity in the internal political spectrum in India—ranging from the radical right (the Jan Sangh) to the radical left (the Communist Party)—impelled the leadership to avoid any international position that would favor either the Communist or the Western powers.

But internal political heterogeneity alone does not appear to be sufficient for the adoption of nonalignment. Although a highly homogeneous and cohesive state, Egypt supported a nonaligned policy in the early and mid-1950's as strongly as did India. That their views today have become somewhat dissimilar demonstrates that the motives underlying the policy of nonalignment may be quite different.

The second class of relevant variables, those of a more specific nature, provides some guidelines along which to distinguish among nations and explains the nonalignment of individual states: (1) the type of motivation leading to nonalignment (is it adopted voluntarily, necessitated by particular political factors, or imposed from the outside?); (2) the level of national capability necessitating adoption (is it from a position of weakness or a position of strength?); and (3) geopolitical considerations (how closely situated are the major powers and what are the strategic and military positions of the nonaligned states?).[5]

The preceding considerations together can explain the adoption of the nonalignment posture. Cambodia is a case in point. Prince Sihanouk's policy of avoiding antagonizing either Communist China or the United States was based on the fact that Cambodia lies directly in the line of fire in any conflict between these powers. Similarly, considering the traditional rivalries and antagonisms among Southeast Asian countries, it is clear that ancient hostilities among the Khmers (Cambodians), Thais, and Vietnamese could be assuaged only through a policy of nonalignment. Sihanouk felt any direct commitment to either of the Cold War powers would only help intensify the probability of violence, and the precariousness of rule by Phnom Penh since American entry into Cambodia in 1970 corroborates his assessment. On the other hand, relatively stronger states, such as India or Indonesia, may become nonaligned in order to attain objectives other than the safeguarding of national sovereignty. (Although this is not to suggest that India could effectively defend itself against a hypothetical Russian incursion or a not-so-hypothetical Chinese attack. India's overall capability—including its diplomatic capability—is thought to be at least a deterrent to such developments.) In general, international rather than internal imperatives become more important determinants of policy for governments coping with a more homogeneous society.

With these considerations in mind, it becomes possible to compare different states in terms of motivation, capability, and proximity to major powers. For example, relative to other Afro-Asian state, India would rank high on proximity, high on capability and low (or perhaps medium) on motivation. By contrast,

Cambodia would rank high on proximity, low on capability, and high on motivation. Niger would rank low on all three dimensions.[6]

It is important next to examine the nonaligned states' definition of the world situation and their conception of their own international posture. These are probably more important in determining official policy than the three factors of proximity, capability, and motivation.

In terms of the *definition of the situation*, one hypothesis argues that the nonaligned states view the international system with a certain disenchantment (cf. Choucri, 1967). Because of prevailing tensions and frustrations—such as the maintenance of antagonistic blocs, the maintenance of hierarchy and inequality among nations, and evidence of the perpetuation of colonialism in certain areas —it may well be that the nonaligned states evaluate the the action of East and West in essentially the same terms. For these reasons, the Afro-Asians are likely to be even more favorably predisposed toward a Third World ethos than would be expected solely on the basis of common past experiences.

Given the net effects of common experiences and individual characteristics, the general perceptual framework or orientation underlying the official policy of nonaligned states might be expressed in at least three ways. First, there might be *neutralism*, where impartiality prevails in evaluations of East and West. This means that differences between Cold War antagonists are indeed recognized but that this recognition is not translated into any ideological preference for East or West. The second type of perceptual orientation, closely related to the first, might be a kind of *partiality*, where states do in fact perceive significant differences between the major powers and for this very reason find it advisable to opt for a nonaligned posture. Cambodia under Sihanouk comes to mind again: "When two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers" (Crabb, 1965, p. 2). Yet another type of perceptual orientation might be one of *nondifferentiation*, based on an inability to recognize distinctions between East and West.

In terms of intentions or *plans for actions*, nonalignment stipulates a refusal to side with either East or West and the adoption of policies based largely on how the major powers act toward the nonaligned. The nonaligned are also more interested in pragmatic than ideological politics, and this preference leaves room for informal alignment should the situation arise. Moreover, the nonaligned tend to define their role as mediator between the powers, however unrealistic this may at times appear to be, and however inconsistent their self-perceived role is with actual behavior.

The *operational rationale* of nonalignment is the explicit reasoning process underlying both policy formation and overt behavior. This rationale is predicated on assessments of the international system, various background conditions, the position of the major powers, and on current plans for action, as noted in Fig. 5:1. The operational rationale links perceptions to overt behavior. In capsule form, the rationale of nonalignment, from the point of view of the Afro-Asian states themselves, involves a fairly straightforward line of reasoning:

1. Nonalignment enhances freedom of action for the uncommitted nations by widening the limits of permissible interactions with other aligned and nona-

ligned nations, thus allowing the nonaligned some say in interactions with the East and West insofar as the nonaligned can then impose their own constraints on new relations that might develop.

2. Nonalignment is consistent with the need for nation- and state-building.
3. Nonalignment offers a degree of status and prestige to the weaker nations within the prevailing international ethos of freedom and independence.

An additional consideration is worthy of note. As the colonial experience receded into the past, the Afro-Asians utilized nonalignment as a new basis for relations with each other. This shared antialliance posture thus reinforced further the bond which common historical experiences had first provided (Jansen, 1966, p. 227).

General background conditions—as channeled through the processes discussed earlier—are translated by an operational rationale into certain *behavioral predispositions*. In addition to an eschewing of alliances at the global level, these predispositions also constitute a refusal to engage either in regional alliances conceived in a Cold War context or in alliances of nations of markedly unequal capability. The *behavior* of nonaligned nations, we could therefore hypothesize, includes patterns of interactions with East and West based on actions of the major powers toward the nonaligned, relatively diversified transactions with East and West in trade and aid, and a position on voting questions in the United Nations determined more by the issue involved rather than by the ideology at stake.

In modeling nonalignment in terms of background conditions, perceptual processes, and behavioral predispositions, we have reduced a large number of variables to a set of manageable categories. The general statement of the Afro-Asian model is summarized in Table 5:1, where we have formalized various aspects of the main issue by separating background conditions, perceptual orientation, and response patterns. An initial step in formalizing these relationships involves deriving specific hypotheses from the general model. The parameters of the nonaligned issue include (1) the *contents* of policy, perceptions, and behavior (2) the *relationships* among policy, perceptions, and behavior. (3) the degree of *variation* among the nonaligned in terms of perceptions and behavior, and (4) *changes* in perceptual and behavioral orientations (Choucri, 1969a). In the following sections of this chapter we shall discuss studies which attempt to relate the perceptual base and behavioral manifestations of nonalignment to official policy.

It should be pointed out that the distinction between perceptual and behavioral analysis is not merely rhetorical. An emphasis on attitudes and perceptions yields a certain type of information that may or may not be consistent with that yielded by behavioral analysis. It would be a mistake to assume that official policy is necessarily congruent with either actions or dominant perceptions.

IV. Perceptual Orientation

The adoption of a policy of nonalignment by so many Afro-Asian countries suggests that common attitudinal orientations exist. The key issue here involves

TABLE 5:1 Afro-Asian Nonalignment: A Framework[a]

Background Conditions: Stimuli Environmental Context	Perceptual Base: Frame of Reference		Overt Behavior Response: Characteristics of Actions and Operational Rationale
	Image: Characteristics	Plan: Goals	
International System: 1. Major powers: bipolarity. 2. Nonmember states: nonalliance group. *General Conflict System:* 1. Cold War. *Alliances:* 1. East and West globally. 2. Regional alliances. *Behavior of States toward Afro-Asia:* 1. Actions of ex-colonial powers. 2. Actions of major powers. *Domestic Conditions:* 1. Instability. 2. Poverty. *Historical Experiences:* 1. Colonialism. 2. Dependence on foreign powers. *Specific Events:* Varies with each state.	*Assessment of International System:* 1. Negative and threatening. *Actors:* 1. East and West perceived in the same terms. 2. Afro-Asia viewed favorably. *Events:* Varies with each state.	*Formulation of Nonalignment:* No alliances with major powers. *Explicit Reasoning:* 1. Judgment of issues on their own merit. 2. Behavior toward major powers predicated on actions of major powers toward self. 3. Domestic development. 4. Greater interaction with Afro-Asians. 5. Accords status. 6. Copes with any threat from system. Perceptual Base may be one of neutralism, partiality, or nondifferentiation.	*Policy* 1. No alliance with a major power within the context of the general system. 2. No regional alliances within the context of the general conflict system. 3. Alliances at the regional level between states of relatively equal capabilities. 4. Involvement in the general conflict system. 5. Professed mediation between major powers. *Goals* 1. Ease world tensions. 2. National development. 3. Safeguard independence. *Overt Behavior* 1. Similar interactions with East and West in terms of conflict and cooperation. 2. No significant dependence on East or West for trade or aid. 3. No significant support in the United Nations for either East or West.

[a]*Source:* Choucri (1969b, p. 59)

. the content of the belief system underlying official policy. Accordingly, we iden-
tify below some general perceptions toward the international system, the major
powers, and the Third World.

Following directly from the general model, we hypothesized that nonaligned
nations (1) evaluate the major powers (East and West) in the same terms, (2)
evaluate the major powers in the same terms as they perceive the actions of the
latter toward the nonaligned, and (3) perceive the Afro-Asian group and the
policy of nonalignment as highly beneficial. The first hypothesis is designed to
tap any expressed preferences or partiality for either East or West; the second
essentially stipulates that nonaligned countries evaluate the major powers on the
basis of actions of these powers toward the Afro-Asians; and the third allows us
to compare perceptual and behavioral orientations among the Afro-Asian states
themselves. For instance, it is entirely conceivable for some Afro-Asian nations
to be more favorably orientated toward Third World countries than toward the
major powers. But simultaneously, and for a variety of reasons, some Afro-Asian
nations behave threateningly toward other Third World countries (aligned and
nonaligned). In the next section we shall examine the same hypotheses as they
pertain to behavioral predispositions, and it is the degree of congruence between
the two sets of results that will interest us.

Our analysis is based on a quantitative and systematic analysis of speeches
presented by the leaders of India, Egypt, and Indonesia at conferences in Bogor
(in 1954), Bandung (in 1955), and Belgrade (in 1961). Then the same kind of
analysis was made of the speeches delivered before their respective national
audiences in "state of the union" speeches for these years. From the analysis of
these speeches, we were able to derive attitudinal and perceptual orientations of
Jawaharlal Nehru, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Ahmen Sukarno toward the interna-
tional system, the major powers, the Afro-Asian states, and the policy of nonalign-
ment.[7]

By analyzing domestic and international speeches we hoped to isolate the
effect of the audience on the content of the speeches and from this to abstract
the more salient and invariant aspects of these addresses (Bauer, 1958). When
comparisons of international and domestic speeches were conducted, it became
apparent that the perceptions expressed did not differ significantly. The three
leaders tended to exhibit the same orientation internationally as they did before
their own national audiences (Choucri, 1967). This finding seems to suggest that
the audience had little effect on the content of the communication and that these
speeches reflected inherent orientations. Our conclusions regarding the orienta-
tions of the Third World are as follows:

1. Cold War participants are generally perceived in similar terms. When dis-
   crepancies occur, the West is perceived as slightly more active. No preference
   or partiality for either of the major powers is in evidence. By extending the
   argument one step further, we note that little evidence is available for any
   kind of ideological predisposition or preference.

2. In general, the actions of the major powers are viewed in negative terms;
   evaluation of great-power capability seems to be congruent with perceptions
   of their behavior. Actions of East and West are viewed unfavorably by the
   Afro-Asians, but these states did not perceive the powers themselves nega-
   tively—only their behavior was considered suspect. (The distinction here is
   between general evaluations and perceptions of behavior.) Furthermore, the
   Afro-Asians appear to realize the magnitude of the major powers' capability
   and understand that much of their behavior in the international system is
   conditioned by their overall power.

3. The Afro-Asian nations as a whole are regarded more favorably than are the
   major powers. All Afro-Asian states are assessed in the same terms despite
   differences in alliance commitments. Moreover, the findings do not indicate
   any perceptions of weakness on the part of the Afro-Asians.

4. Afro-Asian nonalignment is viewed in positive terms and as a strong and
   active policy. Again, the inference seems to be that a certain strength under-
   lies this posture, but a strength not based on military capability comparable
   to that of the major powers.

5. Nonaligned nations do not differ significantly in their perceptual orienta-
   tions. Whatever the individual motivations for the adoption and maintenance
   of a nonaligned posture, these states share common perceptual orientations
   vis-à-vis the major powers, the Afro-Asians, and the policy of nonalignment.

From these results we might conclude that the Afro-Asians' positive assess-
ments of the Afro-Asian group, as evidenced by mutual attention and mutual
responsiveness to, and awareness of, shared historical experiences, are more
significant components of the perceptual base of nonalignment than negative
evaluations of or reactions to the major powers. This negative aspect, however,
should not be underestimated.

V. Behavioral Orientation

The joint communiqué issued at the close of the Belgrade Conference referred
to nonalignment as being based on the absence of any formal alliance commit-
ment to either party in the Cold War conflict. Also announced was the desire for
reduction of world tensions and the eradication of colonialism. However, the
dominant theme conveyed in this communiqué and in other policy statements was
that the Afro-Asians had declared an independent course of action in world
politics, based on national interest and pragmatic considerations rather than on
preconceived ideological premises. The official statement comprised only a broad
guideline for action and gave no explicit directives concerning interaction with
East or West. Working this out was left entirely to the individual states.

Because national behavior can take many different forms, each with numer-
ous implications, it is often difficult to draw any generalizations from all the

different behavioral dimensions. In this section we shall discuss some data concerning trading relations, voting behavior, and patterns of conflict and cooperation. Our intent is to determine, first, the contents of behavior, and then the relationships among actions, perceptions, and policy.

The significance of *trade* in affecting relations among nations is not entirely clear. While certain theorists consider trade as a viable indicator or political interdependence (Deutsch and Eckstein, 1961), others are more cautious, noting only that under conditions of relative equality between two countries can trade assist in the development of mutual responsiveness (Russett, 1967a, p. 126). It is also argued that trade is used primarily for political, not economic, purposes: by minimizing the possibilities of diversification in a small state's trade, a major power can maximize its own control and the dependence of the smaller state.[8] More central to our concerns, though, is whether we can predict alliance policies from trading patterns. If we hypothesize a high congruence between alliance posture and trading patterns, we would then expect (1) a distinct trade grouping among nonaligned nations and (2) an absence of concentrated trade with either of the major powers. Should one or both of these conditions hold, it would be possible to argue for empirical congruence between official policy and trading relations.

In a global analysis of trading patterns, Russett (1967a) found distinct trade clusters among the Arab states and among the Asian states. These findings can be considered as limited evidence of a distinct trade grouping among Third World states.

On the second test of our hypothesis—whether the nonaligned states concentrate their trade heavily with either of the major powers—we draw upon trading patterns of India, Egypt, and Indonesia. For the period between 1953 and 1966, close to 50 percent of each country's trade was with the West, and well over half the remainder was divided (unequally) between the Communist states and the nonaligned (Table 5:2).

Looking at each state's percentages individually, it becomes apparent that trading patterns are highly sensitive to political motives, with a lag of one or two years. For example, Egypt's trade with the West dropped from 66 percent in 1953 to 32 percent in 1957, after the first Suez war. By 1960, when relations with the West had ameliorated, the percentage was increased to 42.5 and further to 52.7 in 1963. The corresponding figures for trade with the Communist bloc are 8.5 percent in 1953, rising markedly to 34 percent in 1957, and leveling off at 27.6 percent in 1963. For these periods, percentages of trade with nonaligned states remained somewhat stationary, decreasing slightly from 20 percent in 1953 to 16.8 percent in 1963. In contrast with Egypt, both Indian and Indonesian trade with the West remained remarkably stationary, with Indian trade slightly more stationary than Indonesian. In 1960, as much as 71.9 percent of India's trade was allocated to the West, in comparison with 6.1 percent to the East and 13.9 percent to the nonaligned. The Indonesian figures for the same year are 55.6 percent of its trade with the West, 9.1 percent with the Communist bloc, and 23.3 percent with the nonaligned. Effects of the attempted Communist coup in Indonesia in

TABLE 5:2 Patterns of Trade[a] for Three Nonaligned Countries, 1953–1966[b]

	Egypt			India			Indonesia		
Year	West	East	N.A.	West	East	N.A.	West	East	N.A.
1953	66.0	8.5	20.0	69.9	1.0	21.3	61.1	0.7	24.4
1954	61.1	10.1	23.1	67.7	2.5	22.8	55.6	1.5	26.2
1955	53.4	15.4	23.4	67.3	2.7	19.5	59.1	4.4	23.0
1956	48.2	22.4	20.0	69.3	4.6	17.2	66.9	4.5	9.9
1957	32.7	34.2	20.4	69.4	4.8	18.5	68.5	4.9	9.8
1958	40.6	38.0	17.2	70.6	5.9	16.6	61.2	8.3	26.5
1959	41.7	36.5	19.1	70.4	6.3	16.1	53.1	11.0	25.0
1960	42.5	32.3	21.9	71.9	6.1	13.9	55.6	9.1	23.3
1961	43.3	33.2	18.6	67.7	8.4	15.4	56.4	8.2	19.7
1962	50.1	29.0	17.4	67.6	10.1	14.1	57.8	7.7	21.3
1963	52.7	27.6	16.8	67.1	10.8	13.9	51.8	9.1	18.4
1964	51.1	27.5	18.0	66.8	12.2	12.0	60.0	10.2	8.5
1965	44.9	34.9	16.9	66.5	12.7	11.8	52.8	8.9	5.8
1966	44.1	35.8	16.8	65.5	12.4	12.7	64.7	1.5	2.7
MEAN	47.6	28.9	18.8	68.2	8.0	15.5	58.2	6.3	17.8

[a]Percentage of distribution to West, East, and other nonaligned states
[b]Source: Calculated from raw data presented in *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics,* Statistical Office of the United Nations, 1953–1967.
Note: N.A. = Nonaligned.

1965 are clearly reflected in trading percentages. In 1964, 19.7 percent of Indonesia's total trade was allocated to the Communist states; two years later the percentage had dropped to 1.5, while trade with nonaligned states dropped from 8.5 to 2.7 percent.

Thus, trading patterns seem to be more congruent with political events (national and international) than with the official pronouncements of nonalignment. In other words, greater sensitivity to events than to policy is in evidence. Second, for all three countries considered there is an apparent concentration of trade with the West, the reasons for which may be more economic than political. Third, protestations of solidarity and mutual responsiveness in statements of official policy do not become translated into trading solidarity. Fourth, if there is a threshold beyond which high concentration of trade with either Western or Eastern bloc would be inconsistent with an official policy of nonalignment, what that threshold is cannot be readily inferred from these data.

A second dimension of national behavior—*voting patterns in the General Assembly*—yields useful insight into the components of national actions. This evidence can assist in locating the position of the Afro-Asian nonaligned states on the political spectrum and also in clarifying the relationship between the nonaligned countries and the major powers.

In an analysis of roll-call votes at the General Assembly, three major issues emerged: Cold War, colonial self-determination, and supra-nationalism (Alker and Russett, 1965). In each case an Afro-Asian grouping emerged as distinct from other clusters, such as the conservative (pro-West) Arabs or the Brazzavile (pro-

West) Africans. A comparison of 1963 with 1957–1958 found that Egypt, India, and Indonesia most typically represent the Afro-Asian group. Voting patterns tend to be rather stable and consistent with political alignments: There seems to be no evident trend toward multipolarity even though the Afro-Asian vote represents a distinct grouping (Alker and Russett, 1965, pp. 252–272). Membership in these groupings is shown in Table 5:3.

Only those states which are allied politically to either the Communist or the Western blocs tend to vote consistently with their allies. Exceptions are Greece and Cuba. Nonaligned countries do not seem to exhibit any definite tendency or pattern of voting consistently with either East or West. Furthermore, as both Wilcox (1962) and Alker and Russett (1965) have pointed out, it is not at all clear whether the Afro-Asians occasionally vote with the major powers or whether it is the major powers that join with the Afro-Asians. For example, the Soviet Union has found it increasingly expedient to support Afro-Asian claims to self-determination. Apparently, there is a correspondence between trading patterns and voting behavior and among trading, voting, and formal alliance posture as well. Countries that trade most heavily with their regional groups are also more likely to vote with that group (Alker and Russett, 1965, p. 260); the greater the cohesiveness in trade and voting behavior, the more likely are there to be political alignments.

Next we shall consider *patterns of conflict and cooperation* as another important component of national behavior and put forth some findings emerging from our analysis of India, Egypt, and Indonesia. Data on the behavior of India, Egypt, and Indonesia were collected primarily from the *New York Times Index* in consultation with *Deadline Data* and *Encyclopedia Britannica Yearbook* covering the period 1953–1966.[9] Actions reported under each country's heading were cross-referenced by checking entries for the major powers and other Afro-Asian states. Close to 4,000 actions were thus collected, on a yearly basis, to represent prevailing *interactions.* The results of this analysis can be summarized as follows:

1. The three nonaligned nations' behavior toward the West and the East did not differ significantly from 1953 to 1966. Considerable similarity was evident in the actions of India, Egypt, and Indonesia toward the major powers, with no systematic bias toward either power.
2. There was considerable congruence in the nonaligned states' behavior toward the major powers and the actions of the latter toward the nonaligned. We may infer a higher degree of dependency in actions and reactions, considerable pragmatism, and an absence of ideological rigidity on the part of these nonaligned states. Again there seemed to be no consistent "leaning" toward East or West.
3. The nonaligned nations' conflict behavior toward the Afro-Asian group was generally less then toward the major powers. Although Indonesia may be a notable exception, a certain degree of cohesion among these nonaligned states is apparent.

TABLE 5:3 United Nations Voting Blocs, 1963

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6
Western Community						
Denmark	0.90	0.12	−0.02	−0.27	−0.01	−0.17
Norway	0.89	0.10	−0.03	−0.23	−0.11	−0.04
Sweden	0.89	0.09	−0.03	−0.25	−0.12	−0.09
Finland	0.88	0.06	0.03	−0.22	−0.04	−0.10
Austria	0.87	0.20	0.00	−0.17	−0.10	−0.01
Ireland	0.86	0.15	−0.08	−0.25	0.16	−0.03
Turkey	0.83	0.18	−0.10	−0.33	−0.04	0.23
Australia	0.82	0.10	−0.15	−0.38	0.01	0.10
Belgium	0.82	0.13	−0.15	−0.44	−0.07	0.15
New Zealand	0.82	0.17	−0.14	−0.27	0.07	0.05
Iceland	0.82	0.14	−0.05	−0.22	0.14	−0.20
United States	0.81	0.07	0.23	−0.27	0.09	0.23
Italy	0.81	0.12	−0.12	−0.37	0.14	0.11
Canada	0.80	0.09	−0.15	−0.44	−0.02	0.17
Netherlands	0.80	0.05	−0.11	−0.46	0.03	0.09
Japan	0.76	0.23	−0.11	−0.33	0.31	0.06
China (Taiwan)	0.75	0.40	−0.01	−0.11	0.07	0.09
United Kingdom	0.72	−0.16	−0.22	−0.46	0.07	0.09
Greece	0.71	0.23	−0.21	−0.29	−0.03	0.15
Iran	0.61	0.38	−0.01	−0.04	0.33	−0.04
El Salvador[a]	0.59	0.36	0.00	−0.29	0.29	0.34
France	0.59	0.01	−0.48	−0.02	−0.23	0.27
Brazzaville Africans						
Chad	0.12	0.87	0.17	0.01	−0.03	0.06
Cameroun	0.20	0.79	0.29	−0.08	−0.08	−0.06
Gabon[a]	0.20	0.79	0.23	0.08	0.06	0.04
Central Afr. Rep.	0.17	0.78	0.03	0.01	−0.09	0.10
Niger	0.02	0.78	0.34	−0.03	0.04	0.14
Congo (B)	0.07	0.77	0.28	0.08	−0.09	−0.00
Rwanda	0.23	0.76	0.16	−0.09	0.05	−0.20
Haiti[a]	0.16	0.74	−0.06	0.00	0.01	0.10
Ivory Coast	0.08	0.73	0.35	−0.04	0.27	−0.04
Upper Volta	−0.09	0.73	0.37	0.05	−0.12	−0.06
Congo (L)	0.22	0.72	0.22	0.01	0.01	−0.17
Dahomey	0.07	0.70	0.32	−0.03	0.05	−0.11
Bolivia[a]	0.37	0.68	0.10	−0.15	0.14	0.01
Senegal	0.12	0.68	0.26	0.19	0.19	0.15
Uruguay	0.35	0.68	0.11	0.08	0.23	0.04
Madagascar	0.39	0.62	0.05	−0.14	0.32	−0.09
Sierra Leone	0.05	0.62	0.41	−0.01	−0.02	−0.09
Liberia	0.41	0.62	0.09	−0.14	0.32	−0.17
Togo	0.09	0.62	0.49	−0.02	0.23	−0.01
Latin America						
Venezuela	0.70	0.52	−0.01	−0.07	0.13	−0.02
Argentina	0.70	0.49	−0.04	−0.10	0.12	0.09
Guatemala	0.65	0.52	0.07	−0.17	0.09	−0.05

table continues

TABLE 5:3 (cont.)

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6
			Latin America (cont.)			
Panama	0.63	0.51	0.05	0.08	0.09	0.05
Colombia	0.62	0.52	0.15	0.08	0.16	0.09
Ecuador	0.62	0.50	−0.05	−0.06	0.32	0.05
Costa Rica	0.61	0.61	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.05
Mexico	0.61	0.52	0.11	0.01	0.39	−0.07
Thailand	0.60	0.52	0.05	−0.02	0.15	0.14
Jamaica	0.59	0.51	0.03	0.06	0.32	−0.19
Chile	0.58	0.52	0.28	−0.08	0.18	0.05
Brazil	0.56	0.43	0.01	−0.04	0.10	0.05
Peru	0.56	0.49	0.03	0.02	0.17	0.34
Malaysia	0.55	0.55	0.21	0.06	0.43	0.03
Nicaragua[a]	0.55	0.38	0.09	−0.32	0.02	0.17
Paraguay	0.53	0.47	0.00	−0.20	0.19	0.18
Cyprus	0.52	0.71	0.04	−0.06	0.08	0.01
Pakistan	0.50	0.51	0.21	0.01	0.09	−0.09
Philippines	0.49	0.63	0.09	−0.05	0.26	0.03
Israel	0.43	0.53	−0.04	−0.18	0.04	−0.31
			Afro-Asians			
Ghana	−0.09	0.14	0.88	0.17	−0.11	−0.04
Afghanistan	−0.15	0.15	0.84	0.23	−0.00	0.06
Indonesia	−0.17	0.08	0.82	0.13	−0.19	0.12
Egypt	−0.09	0.07	0.82	0.30	0.06	0.06
Syria	−0.05	0.09	0.82	0.30	0.04	0.07
Ethiopia	−0.02	0.11	0.82	0.18	0.00	−0.14
Yugoslavia	−0.18	0.15	0.80	0.29	−0.03	0.02
India	0.12	0.19	0.75	0.02	0.31	−0.07
Algeria	−0.22	0.16	0.74	−0.40	0.09	0.02
Nigeria	0.01	0.26	0.74	−0.13	0.04	0.25
Iraq	−0.24	0.15	0.73	0.30	0.25	−0.04
Tunisia	−0.02	0.25	0.73	0.13	−0.01	−0.07
Burma[a]	0.05	0.13	0.72	0.24	−0.06	0.08
Cambodia	−0.13	0.13	0.72	0.31	0.03	−0.03
Tanganyika	−0.18	0.33	0.67	0.22	0.10	−0.16
Guinea	−0.13	0.29	0.67	0.32	0.09	0.05
Mali	−0.25	0.09	0.65	−0.42	0.27	−0.11
Ceylon	0.02	0.19	0.65	0.21	0.05	−0.02
Sudan	0.00	0.24	0.60	0.24	0.05	−0.09
Morocco	−0.15	0.13	0.58	0.35	0.40	−0.06
Somalia[a]	−0.04	0.22	0.55	0.11	0.08	0.27
Uganda[a]	−0.02	0.32	0.55	0.27	0.06	0.03
Yemen[a]	−0.02	0.24	0.53	0.32	0.04	−0.13
			Communists			
Czechoslovakia	−0.42	−0.04	0.28	0.85	−0.02	−0.02
U.S.S.R.	−0.42	−0.04	0.28	0.85	−0.02	−0.02
Bulgaria	−0.41	−0.05	0.29	0.85	−0.03	−0.02
Byelorussia	−0.42	−0.05	0.29	0.85	0.07	−0.06

table continues

TABLE 5:3 (cont.)

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6
			Communists (cont.)			
Poland	−0.42	−0.05	0.29	0.85	0.07	−0.06
Cuba	−0.36	0.00	0.28	0.85	−0.07	−0.02
Romania	−0.39	−0.05	0.32	0.84	−0.02	0.02
Ukraine	−0.45	−0.02	0.28	0.83	−0.04	−0.03
Hungary	−0.40	−0.07	0.27	0.83	0.16	−0.08
Mongolia	−0.42	−0.06	0.29	0.82	0.16	−0.10
Albania	−0.27	0.01	0.49	0.59	−0.05	−0.07
			Conservative Arabs			
Lebanon	0.09	0.16	0.46	0.08	0.66	0.10
Jordan	0.17	0.34	0.46	0.25	0.58	−0.03
Libya	0.21	0.44	0.45	0.01	0.54	−0.05
Mauritania	0.08	0.53	0.38	0.18	0.49	0.00
Kuwait	0.14	0.29	0.58	0.24	0.47	−0.06
			Iberia			
Portugal	0.23	−0.25	−0.06	−0.44	−0.08	0.68
Spain	0.52	0.13	−0.11	−0.26	0.09	0.66
			Unclassifiable			
Burundi	0.14	0.30	0.48	0.19	−0.09	−0.17
Laos[a]	0.26	0.19	0.40	0.07	0.27	0.04
Nepal	0.14	0.36	0.47	−0.06	0.04	−0.01
Saudi Arabia[a]	0.22	0.14	0.39	0.32	0.18	0.15
Trinidad	0.42	0.41	0.18	0.06	0.07	−0.03

[a]More than 25% absenteeism (but less than 40%); absent equated with abstain.

Source: Russett (1967a, pp. 69–71).

4. Differences among nonaligned states did appear; patterns of actions are not necessarily similar. India seemed more cooperative toward the West than toward the East, whereas both Egypt and Indonesia interacted with the West at a higher level of violence than did India. What this discrepancy points to again is the high degree of pragmatism evident in nonalignment policies and the absence of behavioral rigidity. Developments in the Middle East certainly support the notion of behavioral alignment between Egypt and the Soviet Union, and between the United States and Israel.

5. The pattern of this nonaligned behavior did not change significantly over time. However, certain exceptions are apparent: India's interactions with the Communists, especially China, became increasingly conflictual, and the same pattern appears in Egypt's interactions with the West. These changes are related, of course, to developments in regional politics. From this we may infer that behavior toward the major powers may be highly dependent on the actions of the latter toward the nonaligned, though, as we have seen earlier,

leanings to East or West seem to be based on political and pragmatic, not ideological, motives. It could be argued that the 1962 Sino–Indian border dispute gave rise to an informal alignment between India and the Western powers, although that alignment was not elevated to a formal status.

We now turn to the relationship among trading patterns, voting behavior, and political interaction—especially conflict behavior. A hypothesis that there is a high degree of consistency among these three aspects of national orientation is not entirely borne out by the data. An analysis of the relationships among six variables—(1) percentage of trade with the United States, (2) percentage of trade with the Soviet Union, (3) high conflict behavior toward the United States, (4) high conflict behavior toward the Soviet Union, (5) voting in the General Assembly congruent with US votes, and (6) voting in the General Assembly congruent with USSR voting—for India, Egypt, and Indonesia during the ten years between 1953 and 1963 yielded few significant correlations. The results are presented in Table 5:4. Egypt and Indonesia are more similar to each other than either is to

TABLE 5:4 Correlations among Behavioral Indicators for Three Nonaligned Countries, 1953–1963[a]

Country		Vote US	Vote USSR	Violence US	Violence USSR	Trade US
Egypt	Vote–USSR	−.44				
	Violence–US	−.21	.51			
	Violence–USSR	.43	−.50	−.20		
	Trade–US	−.63	.19	−.12	−.13	
	Trade–USSR	−.29	.33	.08	.40	.05
India	Vote–USSR	−.73				
	Violence–US	.17	−.50			
	Violence–USSR	.10	.07	.09		
	Trade–US	.04	−.45	−.05	−.47	
	Trade–USSR	.20	−.48	−.17	−.32	.89
Indonesia	Vote–USSR	−.41				
	Violence–US	−.01	−.31			
	Violence–USSR	−.19	−.21	.57		
	Trade–US	−.13	.46	−.14	−.17	
	Trade–USSR	−.68	.01	.30	.37	.04

[a]*Note:* Correlations greater than ±.50 are *italicized.*

India. For example, in the first case conflict behavior is correlated negatively with voting in the United Nations, in the second the relationship is positive though low. Furthermore, Indonesia and Egypt exhibit a positive relationship between conflict behavior toward the Soviet Union and trade with the USSR, whereas the relationship in the case of India is of an inverse nature. In all three cases, however,

violence toward the United States and voting with the United States are positively correlated. On the other hand, trade with the United States correlates negatively with voting with the United States (except in the case of India). This last set of relationships is of a positive nature insofar as interaction with the Soviet Union is concerned.

These relationships become somewhat more meaningful when the data are consolidated to reflect three distinct variables: *votes* (the ratio of the difference between votes with the USSR and votes with the United States to total votes), *violence* (the highest conflict peak toward East and West), and *trade* (percentage of trade with East and West in relation to total trade). In two cases (Egypt and Indonesia) trade and violence correlate positively with votes (Table 5:5). In only

TABLE 5:5 Trade, Votes, and Violence: Correlation Coefficients for Three Nonaligned Countries

Country		Votes	Violence
Egypt	Violence	.37	
	Trade	.33	−.02
India	Violence	.12	
	Trade	.05	.57
Indonesia	Violence	.48	
	Trade	.64	.24

Note: Correlations greater than ±.50 are *italicized.*

one case (India) do trade and violence correlate both positively and strongly: The relationship is much weaker for Indonesia and negligible for Egypt. In all three cases, however, there appears to be a positive correlation between conflict behavior and votes. But because correlation coefficients measure only the strength of a relationship and not the nature of that relationship, it is not possible to infer the direction of causation.

VI.   The Issue of Congruence in Perspective: Policy, Perceptions, and Behavior

This analysis of Afro-Asian nonalignment has been concerned with the degree of congruence between official policy, attitudes of the national leadership, and national behavior. At this point we shall attempt to evaluate our perceptual and behavioral findings in relation to the policy of nonalignment.

In analyzing domestic and international speeches delivered by three Afro-Asian leaders—Nehru, Nasser, and Sukarno—we found no systematic expres-

sions of a preference for either East or West or for the ideologies associated with each. At the same time, however, there are some sharp differences in the leaders' behavior toward the Cold War antagonists which are not easily reconcilable with these leaders' expressed perceptions. On the basis of this evidence we may argue that perceptions rather than actions appear to be more consistent with policy.

While it may be misleading to accept all statements presented publicly as evidence of genuine perceptions, it might be just as misleading to reject such evidence outright, for it would be naive to expect the nonaligned to equivocate insofar as their behavior toward East and West is concerned. Action is in large part reaction, and thus much of what has been considered here as nonaligned behavior toward East and West might more appropriately be viewed in the framework of the major powers' orientations toward India, Egypt, and Indonesia. Furthermore, the circumstances governing each nonaligned state's relations with the major powers were considerably different; it is not reasonable to expect them to calculate their actions toward East and West solely in terms of conflict intensity and attempt to steer a middle course.

The results of the interaction analysis support the notion of a predominance of pragmatism in nonaligned relations with the global powers. These nations' behavior toward East and West have been found to be highly consistent with the actions of the later toward the nonaligned, and we have also found marked degrees of congruence in the mutually directed behavior between the major powers and the nonaligned. We could infer, therefore, that these nations rely on practical politics rather than on ideological considerations in adopting certain behavior patterns.

There appears to be considerably similarity among the three nonaligned states in their perceptual orientation toward the international system, East and West, the Afro-Asian group, and the policy on nonalignment (Choucri, 1967, Chapters 8, 9). Our perceptual analysis of attitudes and orientations yielded no evidence of predispositions toward either of the major powers. On the other hand, we cannot argue for similarity in overt behavior. There are enough differences among these nonallied states in their political interactions with the major powers, their trading relations, and their voting patterns in the General Assembly to raise serious doubts about any cohesive behavioral orientation.

Finally, we should say a few words about *changes* in these states' orientation in the international system. On the whole we have found a remarkable degree of consistency over time in perceptual assessments. With few exceptions, attitudes expressed in 1955 were highly congruent with those expressed in 1961. However, during the same period, changes were apparent in these states' interactions with the major powers, in their trading relations, and in their voting patterns in the General Assembly. Nonetheless, the evidence is ambiguous and precludes any specific conclusions concerning dependencies among these three aspects of national behavior.[10]

As regards another aspect of change, at this time the original international conditions that gave rise to the Third World position are no longer overriding,

although remnants—particularly in terms of the Cold War conflict, colonial issues, and above all the domestic situations in these states—are still very much in evidence. However, for the Afro-Asians themselves, of course, the causes of their nonalignment are just as important today as they were ten or fifteen years ago, and it would be misleading to overestimate the impact of the changing international environment on the policy orientation of Afro-Asia; it may be a long time before alternative policy options are evolved by them. States, like individuals, operate in part on the basis of memory, learned behavior, and past experiences. Changes in policy often lag behind changes in the concrete realities of nations' situations—in their external environment or in domestic politics. History has shown us that it is not unusual for states, like individuals, to hold onto positions regardless of changing conditions. Changes in the international system thus far have not been urgent enough to warrant a reassessment on the part of the Afro-Asian nonaligned states.[11]

What emerges from this study is that the role of nonalignment, as a policy, is to define only the broadest lines of behavior and the parameters of permissible action. Beyond that, nonalignment seems to have little bearing on actual behavior.[12] Thus, it may be a distortion to assume that nonalignment is designed to regulate actions and reactions; more often than not, it serves only as a framework within which day-to-day decisions are undertaken.

Furthermore, we cannot talk of *degrees* of nonalignment, but rather of degrees of perceptual or behavioral leanings. In the last analysis, the crucial issue is a behavioral one.

By way of concluding our evaluation of Third World nonalignment it is important to put this policy in its global context. In realpolitik terms the importance of nonalignment in the international system is defined, in part, by the degree of cohesion among the nonaligned countries themselves and, as well, by the emphasis that the major powers place on the whole question of alliances and counteralliances. The shift in American policy from the early and mid-1950's to the mid- and later 1960's illustrates this point. Whereas John Foster Dulles considered nonalignment "immoral," succeeding American Secretaries of State displayed considerably greater tolerance. The change in orientation was perhaps more indicative of changes in the internal cohesion of the Western and Communist alliances than a consolidation of the Afro-Asian group. Nonetheless, the diplomatic impact of the nonaligned cannot be denied, and they manage to have some influence on the conduct of political discourse at the international level.

The influence of the nonaligned nations is not, however, immediately translated into power relations. In the last analysis, these nations are still dependent upon the major powers for a definition of their international positions. We must therefore continue to conceive of antialliance postures in terms of dominant international cleavages. And the impact of nonalignment on the international system, in terms of reinforcing stability or instability, is only an appendage to what is obviously major power control.

VII. Postscript

In closing, a note on recent events as of 1972 might be in order. India has signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. Egypt's continued dependence upon Soviet economic and military assistance has become a matter of national policy, although Soviet personnel were asked to leave in 1972. In each case, the factors leading away from a nonaligned posture were predominantly regional in nature. Local conflicts and local tensions led to a break with the nonaligned posture, as enunciated in 1955 at Bandung. In terms of global politics, the major powers are unquestionably in control of outcomes. In terms of regional politics, however, the policy of nonalignment afforded both India and Egypt with sufficient maneuverability to maximize perceived benefits from official ties to a major power.

No less significant in this context is the abortive communist coup of 1965 in Indonesia. The gradual but unmistakable policy shifts toward the East during the years immediately preceding the coup were sharply replaced after 1967 by a cooling of relations with Communist countries and gradual return to normalcy with Western and Afro-Asian countries. The policy of nonalignment, never formally relinquished, served to assist in renewing ties with the West and with Afro-Asian states following the failure of the coup and the overthrow of Sukarno.

Nonalignment, a policy enuciated in a global context of Cold War antagonism, is no longer relevant in the context of an emerging multipolar international order. Nor is it relevant to regional politics where high levels of tensions, punctuated by occasional eruptions, become the rule rather than the exception. The similarity among policy, perceptions, and behavior in a regional context must, by necessity, accompany any analysis in the global context before the fate and implications of this most recent nonalliance posture can be assessed.

Notes

1. This chapter stems from the author's Ph. D. dissertation submitted to Stanford University in 1967. The first drafts of this chapter were written in late 1968 and early 1969. No revisions, except by the editor in an effort to update some sections, have been made since. I have had the opportunity to revise the chapter in light of more recent developments, but I have chosen not to do so for two reasons. First, the essay represents the state of affairs in systematic international relations three to five years ago and as such is an illustration of the state of the art at that time. Second, it is my belief that the conclusions of this chapter are still relevant today despite significant changes in global politics. In view of recent developments in the Middle East, in the Indian subcontinent, and in Southeast Asia, few would argue that Egypt, India, or Indonesia are today allied either to the Communist bloc or the West. The rationale for their nonalignment is discussed in this chapter and the inferences drawn from systematic analyses of their policies, perceptions, and behavior provide some insights into the intricate dynamics of national orientation and international politics. The assistance and helpful criticisms of Ole R. Holsti are gratefully acknowledged, as are the comments and suggestions of J. David Singer.

2. Different types of alliance postures were discussed in Chapter 4, along with examples and illustrations. The present chapter is devoted principally to contemporary variants of *nonalignment*—that is, to official *policy* of noncommitment in the East–West conflict and of nonparticipation in alliances with major powers. The term *neutralism* will be defined later as a possible set of *perceptual* orientations underlying this policy.

3. In some cases the inferences drawn from the distribution of alliances and counteralliances is purely theoretical; in others, it is grounded in empirical observation. See especially Deutsch and Singer (1964), M. Haas (1970b), Hirschman (1964), Rosecrance (1963, 1966), Wolfers (1959), and Zinnes (1967), for representative views of different orientations to this issue.

4. Though not concerned specifically with nonallied states, the quantitative work of Russett (1965), Alker and Russett (1965), and Hovet (1960) provides insight into and evidence of patterns of national attributes and behavior, such as voting records in the United Nations. The position of the Third World is thus delineated.

5. For example, a nation flanked by major powers may become nonaligned as a safeguard against their encroachment into its territory. Thus, Nepal's nonalignment in the current Indo-Chinese conflict may be quite analogous to India's nonalignment in the Cold War during the 1950's and 1960's.

6. The following table could be used for purposes of comparison:

	Motivation	Capability	Proximity
High			
Medium			
Low			

The author has not undertaken any systematic comparisons of states along these dimensions, and the above comments should be considered as illustrative only.

7. The nature of the sample seriously restricts our ability to generalize to other Afro-Asian states. Perceptions were inferred from an automated content analysis of the domestic and international speeches delivered by these three leaders.

8. Hirschman (1964) has demonstrated how Nazi Germany employed trading mechanisms as a means for gaining political control over Eastern Europe.

9. The distribution of data for Egypt, India, and Indonesia is presented as an appendix in Choucri (1969a). See McGowan (1968) for a related analysis of the foreign policy responses of nonaligned African states.

10. An additional difficulty is that we have attempted to relate, both theoretically and empirically, three different aspects of national orientation—policy, perceptions, and behavior—each predicated on different sets of variables and operationalized in markedly different ways. We have attempted to integrate these otherwise disparate dimensions in one mode.

11. This is not to imply that these states are insensitive to the very real changes that have occurred in recent years, but that *from their own perceptive* a reassessment may not yet be warranted given the obvious dominance of major power politics as a global level.

12. In the case of *forced* neutrality or neutralization, however, policy does set very explicit and often rigid limitations on permissible behavior. The formal neutralization of Laos provides a case in point.

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