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AFRICAN CRISES AND AMERICAN POLICY

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Where is Africa going? Cannibalism in Stanleyville, Chinese in Brazzaville, Russian guns in the Congo, assassinations, coups d'état, crises without number--is Africa lurching back toward what Joseph Conrad called the "black shadows of disease and starvation, lying confusedly in the greenish gloom"? Can the United States safely forget about Africa, since the Russians and Chinese will get no farther there than we have? Or must we try to contain Moscow and Peking in Africa by aiding our friends and checking theirs as we do in East Asia and Latin America?

### Africa: Another Central America?

For better or for worse, except for the southern African White Redoubt--Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, Rhodesia, and South Africa--Arab and black Africa are independent; and most African states became independent before they had enough economic and social stability and trained political élites to guard their new freedom. This was true of Central and South America in the 1820's, and there, as with Africa now, the West's initial hope for stability seemed increasingly to give way to slaughter and anarchy. In Africa, with the partial exception of Nigeria and Zambia, democracy does not seem to be finding roots. One-party, dictatorial regimes are the rule, and civil liberties and the rule of law increasingly the exception, throughout the Dark Continent.

The President of Togo was assassinated by 60 disgruntled ex-soldiers. The newly-independent African governments in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika were only saved from grave danger arising from mutinies by their troops as a result of the humiliating if temporary return of British troops. A

few hundred rebels overthrew the government of Zanzibar. Since 1960 the Congo has been swept by anarchy and drenched in blood by scattered rebel bands, and even more by its own undisciplined troops.

If history were merely repeating itself, we could be as indifferent to African anarchy today as we were to Central American anarchy a century ago. But there is one simple and crucial difference between Latin America's past and Africa's present: the Monroe Doctrine, which with the British fleet prevented any European power from expanding in Latin America--until we foolishly allowed Castro's Cuba to become a Soviet military base. Similarly, the British and French, by winning two world wars (with our aid) prevented their enemies--Germany, Italy, and Soviet Russia--from maintaining major power positions in Africa.

But World War II so weakened its British and French victors that they felt compelled to give in to the world-wide wave of anti-colonialism and to withdraw, more or less peacefully, from their African colonies. The United States encouraged them to do so; but even if we had tried to stop their retreat, they would probably have left eventually. Nor have they been prepared since to enforce anything like a European Monroe Doctrine for Africa--anymore than, with the partial exception of the Congo, we have.

Moreover independent black Africa is an exposed power vacuum. With the partial exception of the Algerian and Egyptian armies and air forces, both largely armed and trained by Moscow, the black African states have no military power worthy of the name. Africa therefore was no longer barred to Soviet and Chinese penetration.

### Russia and China in Africa

In Africa (as in Latin America) Soviet and Chinese penetration has become significant only since Moscow and Peking have become bitter enemies, engaged in world-wide competition with each other as well as with the West. Chinese expansionism in Africa is directed as much against Soviet as against American or West European influence, and the Russians have therefore felt compelled to intensify their own African operations. Furthermore, dealing with radical non-Communists Africans has become the easier for both Moscow and Peking because their competition for allies, Communist or not, has increasingly eroded their remaining ideological scruples against dealing with non-Communists. Therefore, since there are few disciplined Communists and hardly any Communist parties in Africa, both Soviet and Chinese efforts in Africa are directed at radical (but not officially Communist) African states and opposition movements.

It is difficult to estimate the extent and seriousness of Soviet and Chinese penetration in Africa. Both Moscow and Peking have considerable influence on, although they do not dominate, such radical African states as Algeria, the United Arab Republic, Guinea, Ghana, and Mali. They are acquiring increasing influence in Kenya and Tanzania. The Chinese are the most influential foreign power in Brazzaville, and they have aided (as, via Algiers and Cairo, have the Soviets) the Congolese rebels. Moscow has out-trumped Peking in arms aid to Somaliland. Finally, while the exile African nationalist rebel groups from the White Redoubt were originally divided into pro-Soviet and anti-Communist elements now, because of frustration, lack of Western support, and the rising power of the whites

to the south, they are increasingly split into pro-Moscow and pro-Peking wings.

#### A Case Study: The Congo

In Africa, the United States is most involved in the Congo. Unlike the British and French, the Belgians there trained hardly any Africans for positions of responsibility; and when in 1960 they precipitously withdrew, there was neither political structure nor personnel to stop the Congo from reverting to tribal war and anarchy. Furthermore, Belgian (and British) support for, plus lack of United Nations and American opposition to, Tschombe's copper-rich Katanga secession (which would have made the Congo economically unviable), plus his own radicalism, immaturity, and drive for power, persuaded the Congo's first Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, to accept Soviet assistance. After Lumumba was murdered, probably with Tschombe's complicity, his associate Gizenga, who still had some Soviet support, inherited Lumumba's claim to be the only true Congolese nationalist and set up a rebel government in Stanleyville to oppose Lumumba's successor Adoula in Leopoldville. Thereupon President Kennedy finally decided that, in order to get rid of Gizenga and the Russians, Tschombe must go. The United Nations force then crushed Tschombe, whereupon Gizenga immediately fell, Soviet influence in the Congo declined to near-zero, Adoula's central government stabilized, and America's prestige, because it had crushed Tschombe, reached a new high in black Africa.

But all this turned out to be only a temporary lull, primarily because the United Nations withdrew from Leopoldville in late 1963. Thereupon rebellions, basically tribal in nature, again broke out in the east and southwest Congo. The rebel leaders sought Communist aid to withstand the Congolese government and its American protectors. This time the Chinese, not the Russians, initially seemed to be supporting the rebels--not, as Moscow had Lumumba, with transport planes, but with money, training, and advice. The leader of the southwest Congo revolt, Mulele, had just returned from two years in Peking. Other rebel leaders, notably Ghenye and Soumaliot also received some aid from the Chinese. They got more, though, from the radical African states, notably arms aid from Algeria and the UAR, who in turn received new arms from Moscow, which rapidly decided not to be overshadowed by the Chinese in aid to Congolese radicalism.

Meanwhile, with the United Nations departure impending, Congolese President Kasavubu and his close associates Generals Mobutu and Nendaka had concluded that only Tschombe, who, with support from Belgian economic interests, was intriguing from Madrid to get back to the Congo, had the ability and ruthlessness needed to suppress the rebellion. They therefore made a deal with him, in which the Americans were not involved and of which they were largely unaware, to return as Prime Minister. Tschombe immediately began hiring white South African mercenaries, recalling his Belgian advisers, and fighting the rebels.

The United States thereupon faced a major policy choice. If it supported Tschombe, it would lose the ground Kennedy had gained in black Africa by suppressing Tschombe's Katanga rebellion. If it did



not, and Tschombe fell, there would be at best chaos and at worst a government in Leopoldville favorable to the Russians or the Chinese. Washington therefore chose Tschombe, and sent him some U. S. planes and some anti-Castro Cuban pilots. The Americans have also tried to persuade him to get some non-South African mercenaries, but with little decisiveness and less success. American support of Tschombe continued until by the spring of 1965 he had increased his diplomatic support among the moderate African states and his white South African mercenaries had scored increasing successes against the rebels. Meanwhile the rebel massacres in Stanleyville had led to American transport planes and Belgian paratroops coming in to save the remaining white hostages, whereupon Tschombe's white mercenaries and Congolese troops massacred most of the remaining rebels.

Who has won in the Congo? Certainly not the Congolese: parts of the Congo have returned to tribal barbarism. Hardly the United States, except insofar as it has prevented a Russian or Chinese-influenced government from coming to power in Leopoldville. As for Moscow and Peking, although they seem at the moment to be losing in the Congo itself, the Chinese have gained great influence in Brazzaville, and both they and the Russians, because of African hostility to American support of Tschombe, have acquired more influence in the radical African states.

The biggest winners of all, though, are the states that make up the White Redoubt: Verwoerd's South Africa, Salazar's Angola and Mozambique, and Ian Smith's Rhodesia. Their mercenaries, supported by American planes, are breaking the Congolese rebellion. Tschombe

prefers to coexist with them rather than to fight them, and discourages rebellions against them based on Congolese territory. America, appalled by the rise of pro-Communist radicalism in Africa, is now less likely than ever to support African rebellions against them. In the long run, insofar as our support of Tschombe contributes to the radicalization of the rest of Africa, Moscow and perhaps also Peking will probably profit even more.

#### Southwest Africa: A Crisis to Come?

The Congo's problems will be with us for a long time to come. Another potentially more serious crisis is looming on the horizon: It will be touched off, if it occurs, by the decision of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, expected this autumn, concerning the South African mandate over Southwest Africa. Until 1918 a German colony, Southwest Africa then became a South African mandate under the League of Nations, a legal status that, as the Court has already ruled, continues under the United Nations. Liberia and Ethiopia, the only African League members, have sued for a Court ruling that South Africa's apartheid policy in Southwest Africa has violated the mandate. Most experts expect the Court to rule against South Africa. If and when it does, it will be up to the United Nations Security Council to take whatever action it deems necessary to enforce the Court's decision.

The Afro-Asian states will surely introduce a resolution, which Moscow will probably support, demanding that South Africa surrender the mandate under pain of economic and military sanctions. The United

States and Britain will then be confronted with a most difficult dilemma. South Africa may well defy the Court decision and leave the United Nations if enforcement is attempted. Because South Africa is by far the strongest military power on the African continent, only a prolonged American naval blockade, including the Portuguese territories as well, could bring her to her knees. Such a blockade might well also produce African revolts in South Africa, with the resultant necessity of United Nations (if not United States) intervention.

Moscow might intervene militarily in support of the Afro-Asians on this issue. France would probably veto any Security Council resolution for intervention. The issue would then go to the General Assembly, where the Afro-Asians would try to get a United Nations peace-keeping force set up to compel South African compliance. They would probably prefer United States and British rather than Soviet support, but they would probably accept the latter if necessary if only to blackmail the United States into participating.

The Russians, in spite of their opposition to all United Nations peacekeeping forces and their refusal so far to pay for them, might well be tempted to participate in this case, for three reasons. First, the United States and the United Kingdom would be so reluctant to participate themselves that they would be unlikely to jump in to prevent the Russians from doing so. Second, if the Russians did join the force--with enough submarines, say, to blockade South African ports--the United States and the United Kingdom would be reluctant to block

the force, saving South Africa and infuriating the Afro-Asians. Third, China, which is trying to wreck the United Nations, would want to keep it out altogether, and therefore Russia might be the more tempted to get in. On balance it seems doubtful that Russia would come in militarily; traditional Soviet caution would probably prevail. But we dare not neglect the danger that they might. In any case, if we allow South Africa to defy a Court decision with impunity, we shall not only further worsen our own situation in Africa (and thus aid Russia and China), but we shall also make a mockery of our advocacy of the rule of law.

#### Prospects for Africa

Because of rising population, economic stagnation, and political instability, increasing political radicalization in Africa is probable. This will weaken pro-Western sympathies and increase Soviet and Chinese influence in the continent. Externally, Britain and Belgium have withdrawn, France is doing so in part, and Portugal's internal stability, uncertain after Salazar, brings the future of her African presence into question. South Africa, however, becomes more stable, more powerful, and more ruthlessly repressive every day. Furthermore, South Africa can, and well may, acquire nuclear weapons, its surest guarantee of successful defiance of the rest of the world.

Chinese influence in Africa will continue to rise, barring a major Sino-American conflict. Because of Sino-Soviet competition, Soviet influence will also rise. Furthermore, South Africa will increasingly frustrate black African nationalist attempts to overcome the White Redoubt. In many black African states this frustration will

be translated into more radicalization at home and into search for arms aid abroad, arms aid which only Russia or China can, and may, give. Neither Moscow nor Peking is likely to fight South Africa directly; they will more likely supply just enough arms to African nationalists to keep the struggle going and to enable them to manipulate African politics in their favor.

Finally, as racial integration proceeds in the United States, the leaders of the twenty million American Negroes will increasingly turn their attention to the African nationalists' faltering struggle against South Africa. Signs of this have already occurred, but it will be probably five till ten years before Negro pressure becomes a major factor in American African policy. When it does, however, it will have much of the emotion and of the significance of the pressure of Jewish Americans to aid Israel against the Arabs. It will certainly be a force which no American government will be able to ignore or neglect in policy toward Africa.

#### American National Interests in Africa

Given Africa as it is today, and what we can see of Africa tomorrow, what are the United States' vital interests there? The most important one, as elsewhere in the world, is to contain Soviet and Chinese expansionism: to deny to either Moscow or Peking dominant influence over vital areas on the Black Continent, i.e. those where the acquisition of predominant influence by Moscow or Peking would

seriously shift the balance of forces in Africa in their favor and against ours.

Some of these areas are of military and strategic significance--air bases, communications centers, and so forth--that is, significant to the Russians or Chinese if they acquired them, not necessarily because they are significant to us now. One thinks of the large United States communications facilities in Liberia and Ethiopia, of the huge air base in Kamina in the Congo, of the Cape of Good Hope, and of the Suez Canal.

Similarly, such areas may be ones economically vital either to the West or to the Russians or the Chinese. One thinks of the recently discovered enormous oil reserves in Algeria and Libya, of the gold, diamonds, and other minerals of South Africa, of the copper of Katanga and Zambia, and of the uranium of the Congo. As the following table indicates, Africa is a key supplier of certain important minerals to the West, the loss of which to either Moscow or Peking would greatly change the East-West economic balance of power.

Comparative Percentages of Selected Mineral Production  
for Africa,

Non-Communist World, and Communist World

1962\*

| Mineral                                      | Unit                      | Africa              | Non-Communist<br>World | Communist<br>World   |
|--|---------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|--|
|  |                           | % of World<br>total | % of World<br>total    | % of World<br>total  |
| Antimony ore                                 | metric<br>tons            | 20%                 | 31%                    | 49%  |
| Chrome ore <sup>1</sup>                      | thousand<br>metric tons   | 23%                 | 22%                    | 55%  |
| Cobalt ore <sup>2</sup>                      | metric<br>tons            | 71.7%               | 28.3%                  | unknown  |
| Diamonds <sup>3</sup><br>(gems & industrial) | thousand<br>metric carats | 95.5%               | 4.5%                   | unknown, Soviet<br>production<br>substantial                       |
| Diamonds <sup>4</sup><br>(industrial only)   | "                         | 90.2%               | 9.8%                   | "  |
| Gold <sup>5</sup>                            | Kilograms                 | 73.8%               | 26.2%                  | unknown, Soviet<br>production secret<br>but very substan-<br>tial. |

Symbols: \*Preliminary or estimated figures

Source: UN Statistical Yearbook 1963

Notes: 1 Excluding Bulgaria, Romania

2 Excluding USSR, Cyprus, Greece, Korea, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Uganda, U.S.

3 1961 figures, excluding USSR, Guinea

4 1961 figures, excluding USSR

5 Excluding USSR, China, Romania

(all Communist countries underlined)

Furthermore, American investments in black Africa are larger than those in the White Redoubt. (Britain's are much greater in the White Redoubt, a fact which explains why even a Labor government in London will do little or nothing against Salisbury or Pretoria.)

Finally, there are politically vital areas in Africa, those whose power, influence, and pro-Western (or at least anti-Eastern) posture is of political importance to the United States in many aspects of international affairs, particularly in the United Nations. Perhaps the best example is Nigeria, the most populous African country, one of its most pro-Western ones, and one with great influence in the whole uncommitted world. Moscow or Peking would go to great lengths to get Nigeria on its side; it is of at least as much importance to us to prevent this.

To say that America's vital interest in Africa should be to deny it to Russia or China is anything but a popular view in Africa: almost all black Africans want only to be let alone, to opt out of great power rivalries and to pursue their own affairs in peace. This continental isolationism is a perfectly natural attitude, and it should not seem strange to us; after all, it was America's foreign policy, except for World War I, until 1939.

But Africa is not shielded from foreign intervention by any Monroe Doctrine. Whatever we do in Africa, Russia and China will continue to intervene there, and radical African states and rebellious African opposition leaders will continue to invite them in. Isolationism may be in Africa's interest, but it is only in ours if it works, i.e. if



East as well as West stays out. Since the East will not, the West cannot. Unlike Moscow or Peking, we can easily afford to settle for genuine non-alignment in Africa. We do not need military alliances with the African states; on the contrary, our own interests in the Black Continent would best be furthered by excluding it completely from the Cold War. Nor must or should we try always only to preserve existing African governments, many of whom will probably not withstand the agitation of young, frustrated radicals; rather, we should concentrate on preventing predominant Soviet and Chinese influence over them. (And we should remember that, as Soviet blunders with Sékou Touré in Guinea have shown, Communist influence in Africa can be brief and self-destroying.) Unless and until this can be done by the African states, with or without our help, we must act ourselves to counter-balance, check, and contain Soviet and Chinese efforts to swing Africa in their direction.

There is one final problem which Africa uniquely presents for American foreign policy: the danger of racial war. Because of Communist China's plan to launch this kind of war against us, and because we are vulnerable at home to racial strife, the United States must be much more concerned than any other Western power to avoid such a racial conflict.

Yet a racial war is exactly what in the long run the African struggle to bring down the White Redoubt Africa may lead to. Not soon: contrary to the whites' fears and the blacks' hopes, the events of the last few years have weakened black African nationalism and strengthened the White Redoubt. Furthermore America's inability and

unwillingness to date to extricate itself from its unholy alliance with the white South African mercenaries in the Congo has made many black African nationalists anti-American, because to them Washington is allied with their white enemies against them.

There are those in the West, in part out of anti-Communist motives, who feel that our only remaining chance for non-Communist, stable governments in strategically and economically vital areas in Africa, and therefore for American security interests in the continent, lies in supporting the whites in the south: Dr. Verwoerd in Pretoria, the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, and Ian Smith in Salisbury. In my view this is a one-sided and short-sighted policy, for three reasons.

First, the United States cannot be committed to racial integration at home and to white supremacy in Southern Africa. Were we to try to be, we would not only drive much of the rest of black Africa and other under-developed areas as well toward Moscow and Peking, but our own increasingly powerful Negro minority would sooner or later wreck if not reverse such a policy, thus leaving us with the worst of both worlds.

Secondly, Portugal may well be internally unstable after Salazar's death, and he is well over 70. We would be unwise therefore to bet on Portuguese rule continuing indefinitely in their African possessions. Rhodesia has 210,000 whites and 4,000,000 Africans--again, probably too small a white base for lasting rule.

The Republic of South Africa, however, is a very different story. The South African whites are powerful, ruthless, wealthy, and fully capable of obtaining atomic capacity. The blacks are terrorized and

disunited. Verwoerd and his Nationalist Party gain in every election and are now making great inroads among the English-speaking whites as well as their own Afrikaners. Left to their own resources, all the black African states will not be able to defeat South Africa at least for the next decade; they can do so only by aid from a major foreign power. It is clearly in the American interest that neither Moscow nor Peking give such aid.

Thirdly, rising instability in Africa makes it likely that the Congo cannot soon reacquire anything like stability without continuing American military and economic aid. We must assume that other, similar situations will occur in Africa in the future. While our objective should remain to turn over such peace-keeping operations to a strong African unity organization not under radical or pro-Communist leadership and not, as the organization of African unity now is, immobilized by internal strife, thus keeping Moscow and Peking out of African trouble-spots, it is not likely that this will be possible in the near future. We must therefore remain prepared to counter Soviet and Chinese intervention, and we shall probably have to do so in part by military as well as economic and diplomatic means. We should use military power sparingly, and insofar as possible not our own alone. But a United Nations force will not return to the Congo, nor will one probably be sent anywhere in Africa; so at times we may have to take the initiative ourselves. We should use economic aid selectively and not steadily cut it, as we have been doing. (We should also not give economic aid to such a pro-Communist radical and anti-American state as Ghana.

Since the black Africans cannot alone overthrow the White Redoubt; since American public opinion will probably not soon favor, nor will American vital interests require, American military intervention to do so; and since we must prevent Soviet or Chinese intervention for this purpose, we cannot and will not fulfill African nationalist desires. We must therefore expect continuing hostility from them. On the other hand, we cannot, for the reasons set forth above, support the White Redoubt and thus risk losing black Africa entirely to Moscow and Peking. We will therefore unfortunately but inevitably balance between North and South, black and white, and at best be unpopular with both.

#### Specific Policy Problems

1. The Congo. We are saddled with Tschombe and there is no effective replacement in sight; it therefore remains too risky not to support him. Yet we need not continue to support him on his terms, thereby losing influence in black Africa and playing into Soviet and Chinese hands. Understandably, Tschombe does not want to rely only on us for support; rather, he wants to balance off the United States, Western Europe, and the White Redoubt against his black nationalist neighbors and each other. Yet American interests are unnecessarily damaged by our public association with South African white mercenaries, who, for black African nationalists, are roughly equivalent of Selma, Alabama police force for Negro civil rights demonstrators. It seems to be American policy to find some other mercenaries, if possible black, if not white, than the South African and Rhodesian ones, but this policy has had no results to date; we should see to it that it does.

Conversely, we have been too easy on some of the Congo rebellion's supporters. This is true most of all of Nasser, who has also been supporting the rebels in the Yemen against the interests of our British allies and against an increasing majority of the Yemen's inhabitants, who has feted Ulbricht to the dismay of our West German allies, and who, finally, is threatening to start another Israeli-Arab conflict. To continue American aid to Nasser in this context, and to stand by while he sends in Moscow's arms for Moscow's benefit, is contrary to our interests. More vigorous moves against him are required.

Finally, with respect to South Africa itself, we must match words with actions. The longer we preach against Dr. Verwoerd's apartheid but continue policies which aid his interests, the more rapidly we drive his African nationalist opponents into the hands of Moscow and Peking. Furthermore, Dr. Verwoerd needs us more than we need him. He cannot go over to Moscow or Peking, but the black Africans can, and many will. It is therefore high time, if only for reasons of national self-interest, that we add deeds to our words of opposition to apartheid in South Africa.

Furthermore, our world influence, our aims, and our hope for security and prosperity rightly are not, and never have been, anchored on power alone. We proudly proclaim commitment to the moral principles of our Judeo-Christian heritage. Yet, as our own churches tell us, the ruling white autocracy of South Africa, while mouthing Christian doctrine, every day tramples the principles of Christian brotherhood in the dust. For this reason as well, we should match words with

deeds. If we do not, we, like the Pharisees, will be found wanting.

The American people will not now or soon support an American naval blockade of South Africa, and nothing less will bring Dr. Verwoerd down. But at least we can make our opposition to apartheid clear and credible. The United States government can best do this by undertaking steps to discourage American investment in South Africa, as a demonstration to South Africa and the world that we do not propose to grow rich off the profits of the economic exploitation and political oppression of Africans in South Africa. (This is all the more a desirable step to take at a time when we are engaged in a worldwide effort to right our balance-of-payments deficit by cutting down American investments abroad.)

With respect to Southwest Africa, we should intensify joint planning with the United Kingdom, the other Western power involved, for the contingency of a World Court decision against South Africa and Pretoria's defiance of it. Our purpose must be to make clear to Dr. Verwoerd that we will neither support defiance of the rule of law nor contribute toward his doing so with impunity. Furthermore, we must see to it that the Afro-Asians do not get Soviet support for sanctions against him without our participation. Southwest Africa, poverty-stricken and with few educated Africans, needs a United Nations trusteeship; we should work toward that end.

Africa is not the most important continent for the United States; Europe is that, and Latin America and Asia thereafter. But Africa is potentially the most anarchic, the most likely to precipitate race war, and the most open to Soviet and Chinese subversion; and its strategic and economic resources and its own weakness prevent us from surrendering

it to its own fate. Nor can we contain Moscow and Peking, as contain them we must, in only part of the world: containment must either be world-wide or it will fail.

Unless and until we need no longer fear Soviet and Chinese expansionism, therefore--and that will be a long time indeed--we are, and should be, in Africa to stay.