Browsing Explorations in Cyber International Relations (ECIR) by Author "Chen, Jing"
Now showing items 1-7 of 7
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Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
(© Elsevier B.V., 2012-01-17)We show that collusion and wrong beliefs may cause a dramatic efficiency loss in the Vickrey mechanism for auctioning a single good in limited supply. We thus put forward a new mechanism guaranteeing efficiency in a very ... -
Mechanism design with set-theoretic beliefs
(© IEEE, 2011-10-22)In settings of incomplete information, we put forward (1) a very conservative -- indeed, purely set-theoretic -- model of the beliefs (including totally wrong ones) that each player may have about the payoff types of his ... -
The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games
(John Wiley & Sons, Inc./© Jing Chen, & Silvio Micali, 2013-01-22)Shimoji and Watson (1998) prove that a strategy of an extensive game is rationalizable in the sense of Pearce if and only if it survives the maximal elimination of conditionally dominated strategies. Briefly, this process ... -
Possibilistic beliefs and higher-level rationality
(© Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2014-06-09)We consider rationality and rationalizability for normal-form games of incomplete information in which the players have possibilistic beliefs about their opponents. In this setting, we prove that the strategies compatible ... -
Rational robustness for mechanism design
(© Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009-11-10)The currently prevailing equilibrium-based approach to mechanism design suffers from a plurality of fundamental problems, and new conceptual frameworks are needed to solve or sufficiently alleviate them. In this paper, ... -
Resilient and virtually perfect revenue from perfectly informed players
(© Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010-01-13)We put forward a new extensive-form mechanism that, in a general context with perfectly informed players and quasi-linear utilities, • Virtually achieves optimal revenue at a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium; • Is ... -
Tight revenue bounds with possibilistic beliefs and level-k rationality
(© The Econometric Society, 2015-07)Mechanism design enables a social planner to obtain a desired outcome by leveraging the players’ rationality and their beliefs. It is thus a fundamental, but yet unproven, intuition that the higher the level of rationality ...
