Browsing Research Papers by Author "Micali, Silvio"
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Fair electronic exchange with virtual trusted parties
Micali, Silvio (© Massachusetts Institute of Technology, n.d.)Assume each of two parties has something the other wants. Then, a Fair exchange is an electronic protocol guaranteeing that either both parties get what they want, or none of them does. Protocols relying on traditional ... -
Knightian auctions
Chiesa, Alessandro; Micali, Silvio; Zhu, Zeyuan Allen (© Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012-01-10)We study single-good auctions in a setting where each player knows his own valuation only within a constant multiplicative factor δ ∈ (0, 1), and the mech- anism designer knows δ. The classical notions of implementation ... -
Possibilistic beliefs and higher-level rationality
Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio; Pass, Rafael (© Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2014-06-09)We consider rationality and rationalizability for normal-form games of incomplete information in which the players have possibilistic beliefs about their opponents. In this setting, we prove that the strategies compatible ... -
Rational robustness for mechanism design
Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio (© Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009-11-10)The currently prevailing equilibrium-based approach to mechanism design suffers from a plurality of fundamental problems, and new conceptual frameworks are needed to solve or sufficiently alleviate them. In this paper, ... -
Resilient and virtually perfect revenue from perfectly informed players
Chen, Jing; Hassidim, Avinatan; Micali, Silvio (© Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010-01-13)We put forward a new extensive-form mechanism that, in a general context with perfectly informed players and quasi-linear utilities, • Virtually achieves optimal revenue at a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium; • Is ...