Now showing items 1-5 of 5

    • Fair electronic exchange with virtual trusted parties 

      Micali, Silvio (© Massachusetts Institute of Technology, n.d.)
      Assume each of two parties has something the other wants. Then, a Fair exchange is an electronic protocol guaranteeing that either both parties get what they want, or none of them does. Protocols relying on traditional ...
    • Knightian auctions 

      Chiesa, Alessandro; Micali, Silvio; Zhu, Zeyuan Allen (© Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012-01-10)
      We study single-good auctions in a setting where each player knows his own valuation only within a constant multiplicative factor δ ∈ (0, 1), and the mech- anism designer knows δ. The classical notions of implementation ...
    • Possibilistic beliefs and higher-level rationality 

      Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio; Pass, Rafael (© Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2014-06-09)
      We consider rationality and rationalizability for normal-form games of incomplete information in which the players have possibilistic beliefs about their opponents. In this setting, we prove that the strategies compatible ...
    • Rational robustness for mechanism design 

      Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio (© Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009-11-10)
      The currently prevailing equilibrium-based approach to mechanism design suffers from a plurality of fundamental problems, and new conceptual frameworks are needed to solve or sufficiently alleviate them. In this paper, ...
    • Resilient and virtually perfect revenue from perfectly informed players 

      Chen, Jing; Hassidim, Avinatan; Micali, Silvio (© Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010-01-13)
      We put forward a new extensive-form mechanism that, in a general context with perfectly informed players and quasi-linear utilities, • Virtually achieves optimal revenue at a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium; • Is ...