Now showing items 1-3 of 3

    • Possibilistic beliefs and higher-level rationality 

      Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio; Pass, Rafael (© Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2014-06-09)
      We consider rationality and rationalizability for normal-form games of incomplete information in which the players have possibilistic beliefs about their opponents. In this setting, we prove that the strategies compatible ...
    • Rational robustness for mechanism design 

      Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio (© Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009-11-10)
      The currently prevailing equilibrium-based approach to mechanism design suffers from a plurality of fundamental problems, and new conceptual frameworks are needed to solve or sufficiently alleviate them. In this paper, ...
    • Resilient and virtually perfect revenue from perfectly informed players 

      Chen, Jing; Hassidim, Avinatan; Micali, Silvio (© Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010-01-13)
      We put forward a new extensive-form mechanism that, in a general context with perfectly informed players and quasi-linear utilities, • Virtually achieves optimal revenue at a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium; • Is ...