dc.contributor.author | Acemoglu, Daron | |
dc.contributor.author | Ozdaglar, Asu | |
dc.coverage.temporal | Fall 2009 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-12-13T13:42:57Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-12-13T13:42:57Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2009-12 | |
dc.identifier | 14.15J-Fall2009 | |
dc.identifier.other | 14.15J | |
dc.identifier.other | 6.207J | |
dc.identifier.other | IMSCP-MD5-025c759738a450d60196ebbd93432400 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/119628 | |
dc.description.abstract | Networks are ubiquitous in our modern society. The World Wide Web that links us to and enables information flows with the rest of the world is the most visible example. It is, however, only one of many networks within which we are situated. Our social life is organized around networks of friends and colleagues. These networks determine our information, influence our opinions, and shape our political attitudes. They also link us, often through important but weak ties, to everybody else in the United States and in the world. Economic and financial markets also look much more like networks than anonymous marketplaces. Firms interact with the same suppliers and customers and use Web-like supply chains. Financial linkages, both among banks and between consumers, companies and banks, also form a network over which funds flow and risks are shared. Systemic risk in financial markets often results from the counterparty risks created within this financial network. Food chains, interacting biological systems and the spread and containment of epidemics are some of the other natural and social phenomena that exhibit a marked networked structure. This course will introduce the tools for the study of networks. It will show how certain common principles permeate the functioning of these diverse networks and how the same issues related to robustness, fragility, and interlinkages arise in several different types of networks. | en |
dc.language.iso | en-US | |
dc.rights | This site (c) Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2018. Content within individual courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology is providing this Work (as defined below) under the terms of this Creative Commons public license ("CCPL" or "license") unless otherwise noted. The Work is protected by copyright and/or other applicable law. Any use of the work other than as authorized under this license is prohibited. By exercising any of the rights to the Work provided here, You (as defined below) accept and agree to be bound by the terms of this license. The Licensor, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, grants You the rights contained here in consideration of Your acceptance of such terms and conditions. | en |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ | * |
dc.subject | networks | en |
dc.subject | crowds | en |
dc.subject | markets | en |
dc.subject | highly connected world | en |
dc.subject | social networks | en |
dc.subject | economic networks | en |
dc.subject | power networks | en |
dc.subject | communication networks | en |
dc.subject | game theory | en |
dc.subject | graph theory | en |
dc.subject | branching processes | en |
dc.subject | random graph models | en |
dc.subject | rich get richer phenomena | en |
dc.subject | power laws | en |
dc.subject | small worlds | en |
dc.subject | Erd?s-Renyi graphs | en |
dc.subject | degree distributions | en |
dc.subject | phase transitions | en |
dc.subject | connectedness | en |
dc.subject | and giant component | en |
dc.subject | link analysis | en |
dc.subject | web search | en |
dc.subject | navigation | en |
dc.subject | decentralized search | en |
dc.subject | preferential attachment | en |
dc.subject | epidemics | en |
dc.subject | diffusion through networks | en |
dc.subject | SIR | en |
dc.subject | (susceptible | en |
dc.subject | infected | en |
dc.subject | removed) | en |
dc.subject | SIS | en |
dc.subject | (susceptible | en |
dc.subject | infected | en |
dc.subject | susceptible) | en |
dc.subject | strategies | en |
dc.subject | payoffs | en |
dc.subject | normal forms | en |
dc.subject | Nash equilibrium | en |
dc.subject | traffic networks | en |
dc.subject | negative externalities | en |
dc.subject | Braess' paradox | en |
dc.subject | potential games | en |
dc.subject | myopic behavior | en |
dc.subject | fictitious play | en |
dc.subject | repeated games | en |
dc.subject | prisoner's dilemma | en |
dc.subject | cooperation | en |
dc.subject | perfect information | en |
dc.subject | imperfect information | en |
dc.subject | positive externalities | en |
dc.subject | strategic complements | en |
dc.subject | path dependence | en |
dc.subject | diffusion of innovation | en |
dc.subject | contagion pheonomena | en |
dc.subject | Bayes's rule | en |
dc.subject | Bayesian Nash equilibrium | en |
dc.subject | first price auctions | en |
dc.subject | second price auctions | en |
dc.subject | social learning | en |
dc.subject | Bayesian learning | en |
dc.subject | copying | en |
dc.subject | herding | en |
dc.subject | herd behavior | en |
dc.subject | informational cascades | en |
dc.subject | decisions | en |
dc.subject | social choice | en |
dc.subject | Condorcet jury theorem | en |
dc.subject | political economy | en |
dc.title | 14.15J / 6.207J Networks, Fall 2009 | en |
dc.title.alternative | Networks | en |
dc.audience.educationlevel | Undergraduate | |
dc.subject.cip | 110401 | en |
dc.subject.cip | Information Science/Studies | en |
dc.date.updated | 2018-12-13T13:42:58Z | |