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dc.contributor.authorAcemoglu, Daron
dc.contributor.authorOzdaglar, Asu
dc.coverage.temporalFall 2009
dc.date.accessioned2018-12-13T13:42:57Z
dc.date.available2018-12-13T13:42:57Z
dc.date.issued2009-12
dc.identifier14.15J-Fall2009
dc.identifier.other14.15J
dc.identifier.other6.207J
dc.identifier.otherIMSCP-MD5-025c759738a450d60196ebbd93432400
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/119628
dc.description.abstractNetworks are ubiquitous in our modern society. The World Wide Web that links us to and enables information flows with the rest of the world is the most visible example. It is, however, only one of many networks within which we are situated. Our social life is organized around networks of friends and colleagues. These networks determine our information, influence our opinions, and shape our political attitudes. They also link us, often through important but weak ties, to everybody else in the United States and in the world. Economic and financial markets also look much more like networks than anonymous marketplaces. Firms interact with the same suppliers and customers and use Web-like supply chains. Financial linkages, both among banks and between consumers, companies and banks, also form a network over which funds flow and risks are shared. Systemic risk in financial markets often results from the counterparty risks created within this financial network. Food chains, interacting biological systems and the spread and containment of epidemics are some of the other natural and social phenomena that exhibit a marked networked structure. This course will introduce the tools for the study of networks. It will show how certain common principles permeate the functioning of these diverse networks and how the same issues related to robustness, fragility, and interlinkages arise in several different types of networks.en
dc.language.isoen-US
dc.rightsThis site (c) Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2018. Content within individual courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology is providing this Work (as defined below) under the terms of this Creative Commons public license ("CCPL" or "license") unless otherwise noted. The Work is protected by copyright and/or other applicable law. Any use of the work other than as authorized under this license is prohibited. By exercising any of the rights to the Work provided here, You (as defined below) accept and agree to be bound by the terms of this license. The Licensor, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, grants You the rights contained here in consideration of Your acceptance of such terms and conditions.en
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/*
dc.subjectnetworksen
dc.subjectcrowdsen
dc.subjectmarketsen
dc.subjecthighly connected worlden
dc.subjectsocial networksen
dc.subjecteconomic networksen
dc.subjectpower networksen
dc.subjectcommunication networksen
dc.subjectgame theoryen
dc.subjectgraph theoryen
dc.subjectbranching processesen
dc.subjectrandom graph modelsen
dc.subjectrich get richer phenomenaen
dc.subjectpower lawsen
dc.subjectsmall worldsen
dc.subjectErd?s-Renyi graphsen
dc.subjectdegree distributionsen
dc.subjectphase transitionsen
dc.subjectconnectednessen
dc.subjectand giant componenten
dc.subjectlink analysisen
dc.subjectweb searchen
dc.subjectnavigationen
dc.subjectdecentralized searchen
dc.subjectpreferential attachmenten
dc.subjectepidemicsen
dc.subjectdiffusion through networksen
dc.subjectSIRen
dc.subject(susceptibleen
dc.subjectinfecteden
dc.subjectremoved)en
dc.subjectSISen
dc.subject(susceptibleen
dc.subjectinfecteden
dc.subjectsusceptible)en
dc.subjectstrategiesen
dc.subjectpayoffsen
dc.subjectnormal formsen
dc.subjectNash equilibriumen
dc.subjecttraffic networksen
dc.subjectnegative externalitiesen
dc.subjectBraess' paradoxen
dc.subjectpotential gamesen
dc.subjectmyopic behavioren
dc.subjectfictitious playen
dc.subjectrepeated gamesen
dc.subjectprisoner's dilemmaen
dc.subjectcooperationen
dc.subjectperfect informationen
dc.subjectimperfect informationen
dc.subjectpositive externalitiesen
dc.subjectstrategic complementsen
dc.subjectpath dependenceen
dc.subjectdiffusion of innovationen
dc.subjectcontagion pheonomenaen
dc.subjectBayes's ruleen
dc.subjectBayesian Nash equilibriumen
dc.subjectfirst price auctionsen
dc.subjectsecond price auctionsen
dc.subjectsocial learningen
dc.subjectBayesian learningen
dc.subjectcopyingen
dc.subjectherdingen
dc.subjectherd behavioren
dc.subjectinformational cascadesen
dc.subjectdecisionsen
dc.subjectsocial choiceen
dc.subjectCondorcet jury theoremen
dc.subjectpolitical economyen
dc.title14.15J / 6.207J Networks, Fall 2009en
dc.title.alternativeNetworksen
dc.audience.educationlevelUndergraduate
dc.subject.cip110401en
dc.subject.cipInformation Science/Studiesen
dc.date.updated2018-12-13T13:42:58Z


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