Browsing Articles & Book Chapters by Author "Micali, Silvio"

Now showing items 1-3 of 3

    • Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness 

      Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio (© Elsevier B.V., 2012-01-17)
      We show that collusion and wrong beliefs may cause a dramatic efficiency loss in the Vickrey mechanism for auctioning a single good in limited supply. We thus put forward a new mechanism guaranteeing efficiency in a very ...

    • Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions 

      Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio (MDPI AG/© Jing Chen, & Silvio Micali, 2016-10-26)
      In unrestricted combinatorial auctions, we put forward a mechanism that guarantees a meaningful revenue benchmark based on the possibilistic beliefs that the players have about each other’s valuations. In essence, the ...

    • Tight revenue bounds with possibilistic beliefs and level-k rationality 

      Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio; Pass, Rafael (© The Econometric Society, 2015-07)
      Mechanism design enables a social planner to obtain a desired outcome by leveraging the players’ rationality and their beliefs. It is thus a fundamental, but yet unproven, intuition that the higher the level of rationality ...