Design of action and alliance strategy in defense against anonymous cyber threats

Abstract

Anonymity, a major feature of the cyberspace, is a common channel to a multitude of threats. Despite efforts to defend against anonymous threats, their rapid evolution challenges the sustainability of any designed strategy for cyber defense. A sustainable cyber defense strategy must be able to dynamically adapt to information about new threats and to utilize international alliance when necessary without violating fundamental ethics. Our earlier research in 2012 analyzed ways to influence anonymous networks that can either undermine the network performance or undermine the anonymity of connecting users. Earlier we concluded that most influential control actions are accessible to State level actors. Here we propose a defense strategy design approach that begins with assessment of the control capacities of State actors over the given threat space (in our case, anonymity). Then we delineate the various motivations for States to exercise control over anonymous communication. We suggest a strategy design process that rests on alliance with States who share the control motivation and who possess highest possible control capacity. This strategy relies on a quality-controlled information system based on mapping new information about the Cyberspace into a compatible hierarchical classification.