| dc.contributor.author | Chen, Jing | |
| dc.contributor.author | Hassidim, Avinatan | |
| dc.contributor.author | Micali, Silvio | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-04-07T18:00:31Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2022-04-07T18:00:31Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2010-01-13 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141762 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We put forward a new extensive-form mechanism that, in a general context with perfectly informed players and quasi-linear utilities,
• Virtually achieves optimal revenue at a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium;
• Is perfectly resilient to the problems of collusion, complexity, and privacy; and • Works for any number of players n > 1. | en_US |
| dc.description.sponsorship | This material is based on work supported by the U.S. Office of Naval Research, Grant No. N00014-09-1-0597. Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations therein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Office of Naval Research. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
| dc.publisher | © Massachusetts Institute of Technology | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | ECIR Working Paper No. 2010-1 | |
| dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States | * |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/us/ | * |
| dc.title | Resilient and virtually perfect revenue from perfectly informed players | en_US |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Chen, J., Hassidim, A., & Micali, S. (2010). Resilient and virtually perfect revenue from perfectly informed players (ECIR Working Paper 2010-1). MIT Political Science Department. | en_US |
| dc.eprint.version | Author's final manuscript. | en_US |
