dc.contributor.author | Adelman, Morris Albert | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2005-09-15T14:44:21Z | |
dc.date.available | 2005-09-15T14:44:21Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1986 | |
dc.identifier.other | 19524024 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/27262 | |
dc.description.abstract | The small LDCs which own the great bulk of oil resour-
ces are rational agents and calculate with short horizons and
high discount rates. They have pre-commitments to spend much (or
even more than all) of their incomes, hence behave like highly
leveraged corporations. They are also undiversified, hence the
risk factors are set not by covariance with a diversified
portfolio or sources of income, but rather by the variance of the
oil income stream itself. Political risk is additional. High
discount rates act both to raise and lower the depletion rate, so
the net effect is indeterminate without knowledge of costs, not
considered here. High discount rates sharply lower the effective
elasticity of demand, and lead to a cartel policy of "take the
money and run." | en |
dc.description.sponsorship | National Science Foundation, SES-8412971 and Center for Energy Policy Research of the M.I.T. Energy Laboratory | en |
dc.format.extent | 1761170 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en |
dc.publisher | MIT Energy Lab | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | MIT-EL | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 86-015WP | en |
dc.title | Oil producing countries' discount rates | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |