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dc.contributor.authorAdelman, Morris Albert
dc.date.accessioned2005-09-15T14:44:21Z
dc.date.available2005-09-15T14:44:21Z
dc.date.issued1986
dc.identifier.other19524024
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/27262
dc.description.abstractThe small LDCs which own the great bulk of oil resour- ces are rational agents and calculate with short horizons and high discount rates. They have pre-commitments to spend much (or even more than all) of their incomes, hence behave like highly leveraged corporations. They are also undiversified, hence the risk factors are set not by covariance with a diversified portfolio or sources of income, but rather by the variance of the oil income stream itself. Political risk is additional. High discount rates act both to raise and lower the depletion rate, so the net effect is indeterminate without knowledge of costs, not considered here. High discount rates sharply lower the effective elasticity of demand, and lead to a cartel policy of "take the money and run."en
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Science Foundation, SES-8412971 and Center for Energy Policy Research of the M.I.T. Energy Laboratoryen
dc.format.extent1761170 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherMIT Energy Laben
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMIT-ELen
dc.relation.ispartofseries86-015WPen
dc.titleOil producing countries' discount ratesen
dc.typeWorking Paperen


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