Now showing items 1-4 of 4

    • Cycles, Gaps, and the Social Value of Information 

      Angeletos, George-Marios; Iovino, Luigi; La'O, Jennifer (Cambridge, MA: Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011-07-09)
      What are the welfare effects of the information contained in macroeconomic statistics, central-bank communications, or news in the media? We address this question in a business-cycle framework that nests the neoclassical ...
    • Decentralizatiohn, Communication, and the Origins of Fluctuations 

      Angeletos, George-Marios; La'O, Jennifer (Cambridge, MA: Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011-05-04)
      We consider a class of convex, competitive, neoclassical economies in which agents are rational; the equilibrium is unique; there is no room for randomization devices; and there are no shocks to preferences, technologies, ...
    • Optimal Monetary Policy with Informational Frictions 

      Angeletos, George-Marios; La'O, Jennifer (Cambridge, MA: Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011-11-05)
      We study optimal monetary policy in an environment in which firms’ pricing and production decisions are subject to informational frictions. Our framework accommodates multiple formalizations of these frictions, including ...
    • Optimal Public Debt Management and Liquidity Provision 

      Angeletos, George-Marios; Collard, Fabrice; Dellas, Harris; Diba, Behzad (Cambridge, MA: Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2013-02-05)
      We study the Ramsey policy problem in an economy in which firms face a collateral constraint. Issuing more public debt alleviates this friction by increasing the aggregate quantity of collateral. In so doing, however, the ...