| dc.contributor.author | Byrne, Alex | en_US |
| dc.coverage.temporal | Spring 2007 | en_US |
| dc.date.issued | 2007-06 | |
| dc.identifier | 24.09-Spring2007 | |
| dc.identifier | local: 24.09 | |
| dc.identifier | local: IMSCP-MD5-bd5e256c3f2b0f3b3d9518661373743b | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/75805 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This course is an introduction to many of the central issues in a branch of philosophy called philosophy of mind. Some of the questions we will discuss include the following. Can computers think? Is the mind an immaterial thing? Or is the mind the brain? Or does the mind stand to the brain as a computer program stands to the hardware? How can creatures like ourselves think thoughts that are "about" things? (For example, we can all think that Aristotle is a philosopher, and in that sense think "about" Aristotle, but what is the explanation of this quite remarkable ability?) Can I know whether your experiences and my experiences when we look at raspberries, fire trucks and stop lights are the same? Can consciousness be given a scientific explanation? | en_US |
| dc.language | en-US | en_US |
| dc.rights.uri | Usage Restrictions: This site (c) Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2012. Content within individual courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology is providing this Work (as defined below) under the terms of this Creative Commons public license ("CCPL" or "license") unless otherwise noted. The Work is protected by copyright and/or other applicable law. Any use of the work other than as authorized under this license is prohibited. By exercising any of the rights to the Work provided here, You (as defined below) accept and agree to be bound by the terms of this license. The Licensor, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, grants You the rights contained here in consideration of Your acceptance of such terms and conditions. | en_US |
| dc.subject | Searle; AI | en_US |
| dc.subject | dualism | en_US |
| dc.subject | behaviorism | en_US |
| dc.subject | identity theory | en_US |
| dc.subject | functionalism | en_US |
| dc.subject | intentionality | en_US |
| dc.subject | externalism | en_US |
| dc.subject | self-knowledge | en_US |
| dc.subject | knowledge argument | en_US |
| dc.subject | chalmer | en_US |
| dc.subject | panprotopsychism | en_US |
| dc.subject | mysterianism | en_US |
| dc.subject | conciousness | en_US |
| dc.subject | rene descartes | en_US |
| dc.subject | mind | en_US |
| dc.subject | brain | en_US |
| dc.subject | causal theory | en_US |
| dc.subject | pain | en_US |
| dc.subject | relief | en_US |
| dc.subject | meaning | en_US |
| dc.subject | individualism | en_US |
| dc.subject | qualia | en_US |
| dc.subject | mind-body problem | en_US |
| dc.title | 24.09 Minds and Machines, Spring 2007 | en_US |
| dc.title.alternative | Minds and Machines | en_US |
